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PROCESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
Louis D. Bilionis* 
Criminal law scholars have pined for a substantive constitutional 
criminal law ever since Henry Hart and Herbert Packer first em­
braced the notion in the late 1950s and early 1960s.1 To this day, 
scholars continue to search for a theory fhat giv:es content to, in 
Hart's words, "the unmistakable indications that· the Constitution 
means something definite and spµiething serious when it speaks of 
'crime.' "2 To their dismay, the Supreme Court has-· 'with two ex­
ceptions - seemingly resisted the notion. . 
The two exceptions are familiar. · First came the 1957 case of 
Lambert v. California, 3 in which the Court came as close as it ever 
has to constitutionalizing a mens rea requirement as fundamental to 
the just imposition of a criminal sanction. Lambert was followed in 
1962 by Robinson v. California, 4 in which the Court came as close 
as it ever has to constitutionalizing criminal law's other Latin half, 
the element of actus reus. Both cases were certifiable break­
throughs that found previously unrecognized content in the Due 
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment, respectively, to limit 
the power of American legislatures to define criminal laws.5 Both 
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1979, University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1982, Harvard. - Ed. · 
1. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 
401.(1958); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. Cr. REv. 107 
[hereinafter Packer, Mens Rea]; see also Herbert L. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law 
Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490 
(1971) [hereinafter Packer, Aims Revisited]. 
2. Hart, supra note 1, at 431. For a discussion of the "unmistakable indications" that 
Henry Hart had in mind, see infra text accompanying notes 54-63. For a discussion of the 
related work of other criminal law scholars, see infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text 
(discussing the work of Herbert Packer) and infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (dis­
cussing the work of more recent scholars). 
3. 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (reversing a conviction where the defendant had failed to comply 
with a state law requiring her to register as a convicted felon and holding that due process 
requires some consideration at trial of a defendant's claimed unawareness of the duty im­
posed by the law). For an interesting account of the Court's deliberations in Lambert, see 
A.F. Brooke II, Note, When Ignorance of the Law Became an Excuse: Lambert & Its Prog­
eny, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (1992). 
4. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the conviction of an 
individual merely for his status as a drug addict). 
5. It may interest some to learn that Lambert and Robinson were argued and won by the 
same attorney, a little-known Southern California lawyer by the name of Samuel C. 
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decisions were tantalizing symbols as well. They held out hope for 
a vibrant relationship between the Constitution and the criminal 
law, one that might develop new principles to help bring about a 
more humane, moral, and altogether more sound substantive penal 
law. 
Yet what followed from Lambert and Robinson, the received 
wisdom holds, is a story of unfulfilled potential, the unexciting tale 
of an exciting substantive constitutional criminal law that never 
came to be. The curse that Justice Frankfurter cast upon the major­
ity in his dissent in' Lambert appears to have stuck, for the case 
indeed "turn[ ed] out to be an isolated deviation from the strong 
current 6f precedents - a, derelict on the waters of the law."6 
Robinson, meanwhile, was consigned to a fate only slightly less for­
lorn, relegated to' the outermost fringe of the criminal law by the 
narrow reading placed upon it six years later by the Court in Powell 
v. Texas.7 Nor has a substantive constitutional criminal law sprung, 
as some have hoped, from robust interpretations of the presump­
tion of innocence and the requirement that guilt be established by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.8 The Court stiffened its back to­
ward such interpretations in Patterson v. New York,9 and its posture 
McMorris, who apparently never argued another case before the Supreme Court. Although 
McMorris had no co-counsel in either case, his cause in Lambert benefitted immeasurably 
from the work of Warren E. Christopher. Christopher, a former law clerk to Justice William 
0. Douglas and destined to have an illustrious career in the national government, was invited 
by the Court to appear as amicus curiae for Lambert when the case was restored to the 
docket after an initial, and evidently unsatisfactory, submission of the case during October 
Term, 1956. See Lambert v. California, 353 U.S. 979 {1957) (restoring the case to the docket 
and inviting the Attorney General of California to file a brief and to participate in oral argu­
ment); Lambert v. California, 354 U.S. 936 (1957) (inviting Christopher to appear and pres­
ent oral argument as amicus curiae in support of the appellant). Christopher filed a brief that 
Herbert Packer later praised as a model of constitutional advocacy in the tradition of Louis 
D. Brandeis. See Packer, Aims Revisited, supra note 1, at 498 (noting that "[w]hile briefs are 
usually (and deservedly) lost to obscurity, this one occupies, in my view, a position of honor 
equal to that achieved by Mr. Louis V. [sic] Brandeis for his brief in Muller v. Oregon[, 208 
U.S. 412 (1907)]"); Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 128-29 (noting that Christopher's brief 
"was one of those rare performances that must gladden the hearts of the Justices"). 
6. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 {Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
7. 392 U.S. 514, 532-36 (1968) (citing Robinson for the limited principle that mere status 
may not be criminalized, while upholding an alcoholic's conviction for public drunkenness 
although his condition compelled him to drink and his economic status may have compelled 
him to appear in public). 
8. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 15 
CAL. L. REv. 1665 {1987) (arguing for an interpretation of the reasonable doubt rule that 
would constrain legislative freedom to define crimes and defenses); Scott E. Sundby, The 
Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 457 (1989) (arguing 
for an interpretation of the reasonable doubt rule and its embrace of the presumption of 
innocence that indirectly would constrain legislative freedom to define crimes and defenses). 
9. 432 U.S. 197, 205-211 {1977) (asserting legislative primacy in the definition of crimes 
and defenses and refusing to interpret the reasonable doubt rule to impinge upon legislative 
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has shown no real signs of relaxation since. All in· all, four decades 
have passed since Henry Hart lamented the Supreme Court's fail­
ure to forge a relationship between the Constitution and substan­
tive criminal law,10 and not much seems to have changed. As an 
heir to Hart's frustration recently put it, "[t]here is no real substan­
tive due process aimed specifically at criminal law."11 
That is the accepted story line anyway, the account to which law 
professors invariably subscribe and then pass on to succeeding 
classes of aspiring lawyers. It also happens to be a significantly in­
complete account of our Constitution pr,odu_ced by a skewed set of 
expectations. As Part I of this article demonstrates, we are inclined 
to see no meaningful relationship. between tpe Cqnstitution and 
substantive criminal law because we expect the relationship to man­
ifest itself only in the trappings of substance, in rights-based re­
straints on the criminal sanction that are grounded in some 
satisfactory substantive theory of crime, punishment, and individual 
liberty. That is our expectation, whether or not we are consciously 
aware of it, because that is exactly what forty years of legal scholar­
ship devoted to the subject has taught us to expect. Ever since 
Henry Hart touched off the discussion, efforts to relate the Consti­
tution and substantive criminal law have concentrated almost exclu­
sively on constructing a theory of substantive justice, substantive 
rights, and substantive restraints - in short, on a substantive con­
stitutional criminal law. 
Starkly absent from the academic discussion to date is a theory 
of process - one that concentrates on the proper constitutional 
roles of judges and legislators and prosecutors and jurors in crimi­
nal law choices, on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the in­
stitutional players involved, on the function of political safeguards 
and institutional discretionary mechanisms, on the significance of 
federalism, and on the countermajoritarian difficulties attending ju­
dicial review under the capacious concept of due process. Scholars 
bent on substantive theorizing have ignored, sidestepped, or glossed 
over these process concerns, explained them away, or (if really 
pressed) simply tabled them. As we see in Part II, our understand­
ing of constitutional practice suffers as a consequence. By refusing 
freedom to reach compromises that shift burdens of proof). Patterson is discussed in detail 
infra sections II.A.3 and II.A.4. 
" 
10. See Hart, supra note 1, at 431 (noting that the Court "has hardly got to first base" on 
the issue). 
11. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CoNTEMP. 
LEG. lssUES 1, 6-7 (1996) (arguing for the development of substantive constitutional criminal 
law). 
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to squarely confront questions of process, we obscure the fact that 
process considerations have been shaping the Supreme Court's ju­
risprudence .at the intersection of the Constitution and substantive 
criminal law for at least seventy-five years. 
Contrary to the conventional account, the Constitution and sub­
stantive criminal law in fact are engaged in a serious, long-running 
relationship that is amply manifested in dozens of Supreme Court 
opinions, ranging from Lambert and Robinson to the burden of 
proof and presumption cases, the vagueness decisions, and the 
Eighth Amendment proportionality and capital punishment cases. 
It is a coherent relationship grounded in process, and it is high time 
we take account of it. 
I. THE ASCENSION OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CruM!NAL LAW 
A. The Origins of Substantive Constitutional Criminal Law 
Theory: The Academic Assault on Strict Liability 
Few American law students graduate these days without some 
exposure to the vigorous attack on strict liability crimes waged by 
Henry Hart and the criminal law cognoscenti in the 1950s and 
1960s. Professors know that one sure-fire way to impress upon stu­
dents the central place that mens rea holds in the structure of the 
criminal law is to draw their attention to a world without it - a 
world that imposes the criminal sanction without an individualized 
determination of the defendant's moral blameworthiness. One or 
two hypotheticals about an upstanding corporate executive12 or 
bank director13 tangled in the net of a strict liability crime usually 
sparks the desired discussion, and by the end of the hour, the classic 
critique of strict liability that informed the American Law Insti­
tute's work on the Model Penal Code14 and that Hart authorita­
tively propounded in his influential The Aims of the Criminal Lawts 
echoes off the classroom walls. 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943} (upholding the conviction 
of a corporate officer for shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs in violation of the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and interpreting the statute to call for strict liability). 
13. See, e.g., State v. Lindberg, 215 P. 41 (Wash. 1923) (upholding the conviction of a 
bank director for borrowing from his own bank in violation of a state statute and construing 
the statute to impose strict liability and to prohibit a defense of honest and reasonable 
mistake). 
14. See MODEL PENAL ConE § 2.05 cmt. 1 (1985) (discussing the Model Penal Code's 
"frontal attack on absolute or strict liability"). 
15. Hart, supra note 1. 
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Today's students generally hit on all the salient points of the 
traditional argument, but one thing always seems to be missing. 
The idea that the criminal justice system might commit a few well­
heeled elites to some undeserved jail time just does not send law 
students of the 1990s into the same high dudgeon that Hart and his 
contemporaries mustered. Perhaps it is a case of underdeveloped 
moral sensibilities, complicated by a propensity to discount injus­
tices when they befall the socially fortunate, but I do not believe it 
is as simple as that. The hypotheticals, and the case against strict 
liability itself, appear to have lost a good bit of their urgency. To­
day, few people place the existence of strict liability high on the list 
of genuinely pressing problems facing the criminal law, whether as 
a source of particular injustice to individual defendants, 16 as an in­
centive to excessive criminalization in the name of social control,17 
or as a force that erodes societal respect for the criminal sanction.18 
Society seems to have its.appetite for strict liability under control,19 
while new and different problems challenge the criminal law as it 
approaches the millennium. But for Hart and the generation that 
witnessed the rise of totalitarianism abroad and felt its reverbera-
16. In cases involving low levels of punishment, strict liability always has had difficulty 
sparking outrage. See, e.g., Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLUM. L. REv. 55, 
78-80 (1933) (accepting strict liability where "the penalty is really slight" but advocating a 
mens rea affirmative defense - with the burden of persuasion assigned to the defendant -
for public welfare offenses involving a possible penalty of imprisonment or heavy fine and 
arguing that "[f]or true crimes it is imperative that courts should not relax the classic require­
ment of mens rea or guilty intent"); see also MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 2.05 (1985) (establishing 
as a general rule that strict liability may be used only in cases of "violations" that are punish­
able by fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty). Cases involving more serious punishment are 
another matter in theory, but it is not just the class cynic who questions how serious the 
theoretical problem really is in practice. Ask yourself how likely it is that a person of stature 
and means will fail to get a fair shake in a serious case due to the presence of strict liability, 
suffering unjust punishment notwithstanding his or her individual blamelessness and efforts 
to persuade the police or prosecutor not to bring the charges in the first place, or to negotiate 
a 'workout short of conviction, or, if that fails, to finesse a jury nullification, hung jury, or 
otherwise lenient sentence. 
17. But see Stuntz, supra note 11, at 31-34 (decrying perceived overcriminalization and 
arguing that a constitutional requirement of mens rea would have the virtue of discouraging 
it). 
18. If anything, ebbing respect for the criminal law today seems to be more commonly 
attributed to perceived shortcomings and disparities in enforcement - phenomena that strict 
liability is often aimed at minimizing. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
19. To the extent that this is so, a debt of gratitude may be owed to the steady criticisms 
of strict liability put forward by scholars such as Sayre and Hart, and to the American Law 
Institute's expressed aversion to strict liability as manifested in the Model Penal Code, see 
MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.05 cmt 1 (1985) (sharply criticizing strict liability and advocating 
severe limitations on it). The widespread adoption of a skeptical judicial posture toward 
strict liability in questions of statutory interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-38 (1978) (discussing the "interpretive presumption that mens 
rea is required"), may be credited to such critical efforts. 
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tions here at home,20 legislative experimentation with strict liability 
presented. very real concerns that it might escalate into a full-blown 
habit with tragic consequences. Society's capacity for generating 
temptations to employ strict liability "just this once" against the so­
cial danger of the month seemed limitless,21 while the affairs of the 
day did not inspire confidence that the "legislature's sense of jus­
tice"22 would know when to say "no" to the passionate urges of the 
moment. For Hart and his contemporaries, the need to hold the 
line against strict liability23 assumed a political and moral impera­
tive to save the people from themselves and to save the criminal law 
from a rampant utilitarianism unchecked by the limiting principle 
of retribution. 
But if anxiety over strict liability is a thing of the past, why these 
reflections on ii now? It is because the way we conceive of the 
Constitution's relation to substantive criminal law has been shaped 
- and significantly skewed - by that anxiety. Henry Hart could 
not have foreseen that his attack on strict liability might help send 
two generations' worth of academic thinking about criminal law 
and the Constitution into a singlemindedness about substance, inat­
tentive to process concerns and to the complexities of institutional 
roles. But it did. That singlemindedness came to pass, at least in 
part because Hart himself, the acknowledged standard bearer of the 
legal process approach, fixated on substance. 
B. Pictures of Perfection: Henry Hart's Substantive 
Constitutional Criminal Law 
Hart started off The Aims of the Criminal Law true enough to 
his legal process commitments. The criminal law pursues multiple 
objectives and responds to multiple values, Hart emphasized at the 
outset, and "none may be thought of as wholly excluding the 
20. See generally Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in 
Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE LJ. 423 {1996) (discussing the impact of totalitari­
anism on constitutional discourse). 
21. See Hart, supra note 1, at 422-23 {decrying the proliferation of strict liability offenses 
"ad almost infinitum" and deploring its corrosive effects). Writing before World War II, 
Francis Sayre saw the rise of strict liability as inevitable in modem society. See Sayre, supra 
note 16, at 55, 67 (noting that the "modem conception of criminality" features a "shifting 
from a basis of individual guilt to one of social danger" that is inevitable in a modem, urban­
ized, and industrialized society). 
22. Hart, supra note 1, at 411. 
23. This was to occur primarily by limiting strict liability to cases of nominal fine, as Sayre 
suggested before the Second World War. See Hart, supra note 1, at 425 n.62 (noting with 
approval the Model Penal Code's limitation of strict liability to "violations" that may not 
result in imprisonment); Sayre, supra n.ote 16, at 78-80 {advocating such a limitation). 
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others."24 Society's criminal law choices thus demand �'multivalued 
rather than ... single-valued thinking,"25 a complex challenge made 
all the more complicated by the fact that the choices "do not pres­
ent themselves ... in an institutional vacuum."26 They arise in a 
wide array of institutional contexts, with each institution empow­
ered and limited in ways unlike the others. "This means," Hart 
stressed, 
that each agency of decision must take account always of its own 
place in the institutional system and of what is necessary to maintain 
the integrity and workability of the system as a whole. A complex of 
institutional ends must be served, in other words, as well as a complex 
of substantive social ends.27 
' 
What is surprising is how quickly what began as a measured 
legal process inquiry became a scrappy, substantive constitutional 
assault on legislative freedom to employ strict liability. To be sure, 
Hart acknowledged legislative primacy in the definition of crime,28 
admitting - as he had to - that American constitution-makers 
generally have refused to place "substantive limitations on the 
kinds of conduct that can be declared criminal," but instead have 
chosen to rely "primarily on the legislature's sense of justice."29 
Hart was quick, however, to qualify that general rule. "Seconda-
24. Hart, supra note 1, at 401. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 402. 
27. Id. As might be predicted, Hart dropped a footnote at the end of this passage citing 
the famous mimeographed teaching materials that he and Albert Sacks produced for the 
Legal Process course at Harvard Law School in the 1950s. See id. at 402 n.3. Thanks to the 
efforts of Professors Eskridge and Frickey, those materials are now available in published 
form. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRoCESs: BA s1c 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994). Eskridge and Frickey describe the materials nicely: 
The Legal Process is a striking synthesis and elaboration (with its own vocabulary) of . • .  
three pre-war traditions: law as policy, law as institutional relationships, and law as nor­
mative reason. Tue synthesis seeks the best of each tradition, without whatthe authors 
perceived to be its drawbacks. Thus, Hart and Sacks' view of law as policy seeks to 
avoid the realists' conclusion that law is nothing but politics and whimsy. Tuey incorpo­
rate the idea of comparative institutional competence but eschew a conception which is 
bereft of substantive evaluation. And they view law in terms of reason, coherence, and 
rationality, without lapsing into natural law modes of thought. The Legal Process set 
forth for a fifties audience a familiar, attractive, yet strikingly original way of thinking 
about law and the legal system. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to Tue 
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra, at xci. 
28. See Hart, supra note 1, at 418 (noting that "[o]bviously . . .  the legislature is an appro­
priate agency to settle debatable questions about the appropriate extent of growth [in the use 
of the criminal sanction], whether or not it is desirable for courts to have a share in the 
process"). 
29. Id. at 411. In qualifying his observation about the lack of substantive constitutional 
limits, Hart made particular mention of the Ex Post Facto Oauses, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 
3; U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See Hart, supra note 1, at 411 n.27. 
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rily," Hart asserted, the constitution-makers "have relied on the 
courts to understand what a crime is and, so, by appropriate invoca­
tion of the broad constitutional injunction of due process, to pre­
vent an arbitrary application of the criminal sanction when the 
legislature's sense of justice has failed. "30 If Hart merely had meant 
to recognize the role of judicial intervention in cases of fundamen­
tal unfairness under then-prevailing due process doctrine,31 his sec­
ondary observation would not be so attention-grabbing. But Hart's 
matter-of-fact declaration actually belied a far more innovative and 
unprecedented proposition: because the legislature's sense of jus­
tice might fail, the Constitution should be construed to erect a sub­
stantive limitation on the legislature that courts may enforce. Even 
though the people, through their elected representatives, declare 
that social utility and public morality alike are best served by de­
nominating X a "crime," and even though they commit to observing 
every procedural safeguard when prosecuting X as a "crime," the 
judiciary - possessed of a special capacity "to understand what a 
crime is" within the meaning of the Constitution - nonetheless 
might declare that X is not wrong and therefore cannot be a 
"crime."32 
30. Hart, supra note 1, at 411. 
31. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1957) (noting that due process is vio­
lated when "some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental" is offended). See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology 
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A  Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 319 (1957) 
{taking measure of the due process jurisprudence of the time). 
32. In addition to the retributive argument against strict liability sketched above, Hart 
also offered a separate, utility-based argument that there was "not, indeed, even a rational, 
amoral justification" for strict liability. See Hart, supra note 1, at 422. According to Hart, 
strict liability's questionable efficacy as a deterrent, the burden it places on law enforcement 
authorities, and the adverse impact it has on the criminal law's moral force all argue in favor 
of using a civil or administrative sanction instead. This by no means establishes, however, 
that a legislature that chooses to employ strict liability as part of its criminal law is irrational. 
It establishes only that such a legislature has alternatives that Hart preferred, but that others 
might not prefer. See id. at 422-25. Given that weakness in Hart's argument, as well as 
Hart's general failure to clarify just how much of a constitutional argument he intended to 
make, it seems fair to read Hart's utility claim as primarily a policy argument, directed at the 
legislature and the public, and not the naked call for judicial second-guessing of the legisla­
ture that his claim would become were it a constitutional argument To the extent Hart 
spoke to judicial ears too, he might well have meant for his utility claim to soften judges 
toward his retributive "moral blameworthiness" argument that indubitably was forwarded 
under the Constitution, and toward his plea for more stringent statutory interpretation as 
well. 
Herbert Packer, by contrast, pressed a utility-based argument against strict liability and 
unequivocally asserted it as a constitutional challenge. Citing Hart as his inspiration, Packer 
made an unabashed plea for heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative determinations of the 
utility of the criminal sanction. See Packer, Aims Revisited, supra note 1, at 490, 493; infra 
notes 111-12 and accompanying text 
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The problem with all of this, as Hart well knew, is that the Con­
stitution never defines "crime " as such and that few who have worn 
the judicial robes have sensed in themselves an individual capacity 
to trump forthright legislative decisions to attach the criminal 
stigma to X or to any other act or omission that is not privileged by 
virtue of a recognized constitutional right.33 Although Hart did not 
say so explicitly, he really was pushing for recognition of a new con­
stitutional right to be free from the criminal sanction absent an indi­
vidualized determination of personal moral blameworthiness. And 
how, according to Hart, does the Constitution prohibit society from 
assigning the criminal sanction to conduct that, upon closer individ­
ualized scrutiny, is "moraJ.!.y neutral, both from the viewpoint of the 
actor and in actuality "?34 Hart's argument offers an exercise in 
what might be called "perfectionist generalizing," by which I mean 
the kind of legal argument that claims to extract a fundamental 
principle from a milieu held relevant to constitutional law - the 
typical milieu being text, history and tradition, or precedent - but 
that cannot make the principle and milieu fit without generalizing 
the former and idealizing the latter.35 This style of argument later 
came to dominate legal scholarship concerned with the relationship 
between the Constitution and the criminal sanction - and many 
33. A different problem arises when the legislature seeks to accomplish all, or much, of 
what a criminal sanction typically accomplishes without playing by the various constitutional 
rules that constitute criminal procedure - when a legislature refuses to call a crime a crime. 
See generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
sexual-predator detention. law against the claim that it constituted criminal punishment 
notwithstanding its civil trappings). A limited judicial authority to affix the "crime" label to a 
legislative measure and to thereby trigger the protections of the Constitution's criminal pro­
cedure safeguards, see generally Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), is quite 
different from, and in no way compels recognition of, a much broader judicial authority to 
remove the "crime" label when it has already been affixed by the legislative process. This 
article addresses the latter case. For recent and illuminating discussions directed primarily to 
the former, see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve 
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinc­
tion, 42 liAsTINos LJ.1325 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the 
Criminal and Civil Law Models - and What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE LJ. 1875 
(1992); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and 
Civil Law, 101 YALE LJ.1795 (1992); Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Dis­
tinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1993); 
Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Crimi­
nal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEo. L.J. 775 (1997); Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple Mid­
dlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE LJ. 1901 (1992). See generally 
Symposium, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEG. lssUES 1 (1996); Symposium, 
The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1996). 
34. Hart, supra note 1, at 421. 
35. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 
391 (1981) (discussing how those with "perfectionist" expectations of the Constitution may 
"extract[] ... quite general political principles from the specific constitutional guarantees ... 
[and] elaborat[e] ... supplemental, nontextually grounded principles of political morality to 
fill in any gaps"). 
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other fields of constitutional discourse as well. Hart's performance 
in The Aims of the Criminal Law was a tour de force in the genre 
that many were inspired to emulate. His constitutional argument 
follows three basic steps, and we examine them in turn. 
1. Mythicizing the Criminal Law 
The first step for Hart was to establish individualized moral 
blameworthiness as an unalterable fundamental of the criminal law. 
This evidently proved much easier said than done, for while Hart 
stated as much over and over, he did little to actually demonstrate 
it. Hart's picture of perfection has considerable prescriptive appeal: 
a criminal law faithful to the precept that "it is necessary to be able 
to say in good conscience in each instance in which a criminal sanc­
tion is imposed for a violation of law that the violation was blame­
worthy and, hence, deserving of the moral condemnation of the 
community."36 Indeed, I am among the many who find it norma­
tively attractive. But as a descriptive matter, Hart's picture resem­
bles the evolving practice and experience of criminal law only if you 
set aside the countless occasions when the precept is not observed. 
That is precisely what Hart did. He mythicized a traditional crimi­
nal law ever true to the principle of individualized moral blame­
worthiness �d - dismissed as mere blunders the most glaring 
contraindications: more than a century of denial of the principle in 
cases of bigamy,37 three-quarters of a century of its neglect in cases 
of statutory rape and similar offenses,38 and nearly a century of 
ever-increasing legislative and judicial acceptance of strict liability 
in public welfare offenses to meet the needs of a rapidly changing 
and decreasingly homogeneous society.39 Hart certainly was enti.:. 
tled to his own opinion about what best serves the public good, but 
36. Hart, supra note 1, at 412. 
37. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844) (criminalizing remar­
riage as bigamy even when the defendant had an honest and reasonable belief that the first, 
missing spouse was deceased). 
38. See, e.g., Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875) (refusing to recognize a 
defense of honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the age of the female victim in a 
prosecution for conducting an improper relationship with an unmarried girl). 
39. See Hart, supra note 1, at 417 (depicting strict liability as something that "neither the 
courts nor the legislature[s] of this country have yet succeeded in thinking through"). Hart 
assailed the immoral and unwise nature of strict liability, noting: 
In its conventional and traditional applications, a criminal conviction carries with it an 
ineradicable connotation of moral condemnation and personal guilt. Society makes an 
essentially parasitic, and hence illegitimate, use of this instrument when it uses it as a 
means of deterrence (or compulsion) of conduct which is morally neutral. 
Id. at 424; see also id. at 430 (treating Prince and Mash as products of inadequate statutory 
interpretation by judges and their "unimaginative and unintelligent use even of familiar com­
mon-law techniques"). 
March 1998] Substantive Constitutional Criminal Law 1279 
the fact that the people, their legislatures, and,their judges have 
begged to differ so frequently and for so long makes dubious Hart's 
claim to an accurate descriptive account of the criminal law and its 
fundamental essence. When you claim, as Hart did, that you have 
identified something so fundamental to the history and traditions of 
criminal law that it has attained the stature of an unwritten consti­
tutional right, descriptive accuracy cannot be compromised. 
The errancy in Hart's depiction runs even deeper. Notwith­
standing the familiar judicial and academic pretensions about crimi­
nal law's supposed intolerance for error - those epigrams that it is 
"far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go 
free"40 - criminal law is not nearly the stickler for individualized 
moral blameworthiness that Hart mythicized, even apart froni the 
historical contraindications just noted. The fact is, criminal law reg­
ularly chooses rules of decision with conscious acceptance of the 
risk that their application will lead to the conviction of defendants 
who otherwise would be cleared of blame in the General Court of 
Public Morality - if only we could create one. Consider that a jury 
may not entertain the defense of necessity in a case of homicide,41 
but not because society feels that taking one human life to save 
several others in an emergency situation can never be morally 
blameless. The same homicide jury likely would not be instructed 
on a defense of duress,42 but this does not mean that society would 
adjudge every defendant in such circumstances morally blamewor­
thy after finer individualized examination. Juries may consider the 
defense of involuntariness only in a limited number of defined 
cases, but not because those cases reach every conceivable instance 
of what society might label involuntary and hence blameless were it 
to wrestle with the particular nuances.43 In most jurisdictions, a 
40. In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Hart relied on a 
similar platitude. See Hart, supra note 1, at 422-23 (noting that "nowhere else in the criminal 
law is the probable, or even the certain, guilt of nine men regarded as sufficient warrant for 
the conviction of the tenth"). 
41. See Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884) (denying the defense of 
necessity while observing that "[i]t is not suggested that in this particular case the deeds were 
'devilish,' but it is quite plain that such a principle once admitted might be made the legal 
cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime" and that "[w]e are often compelled to set up 
standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves 
satisfy"). But see MODEL PENAL CoDE § 3.02 cmt. 3 (1985) (arguing for the availability of a 
necessity defense in certain cases of homicide). 
42. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 613 So. 2d 429, 432 n.6 (Fla. 1992) (stating and following the 
rule that duress is no defense to homicide); State v. Fmnell, 688 P.2d 769 (N.M. 1984) (same). 
But see MoDEL PENAL CoDE § :i.09 (1985) (stating the duress defense in terms that would 
not preclude its availability in homicide cases). 
43. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.01(2) (1985) (categorizing involuntary acts). As 
Herbert Packer observed, the law in this area "is not affirming that some conduct is the 
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jury may acquit a defendant on insanity grounds only if the stric­
tures of M'Naghten's Case 44 are satisfied, but this does not mean 
that every defendant who falls short of that showing is blameworthy 
by society's moral standards - particularly one who would qualify 
for acquittal under a more forgiving formulation of the defense in a 
neighboring jurisdiction.45 Indeed, some jurisdictions now prohibit 
insanity acquittals altogether,46 but it would be wrong to take that 
as a societal judgment that even M'Naghten's clearest cases of in­
sanity are unequivocally deserving of moral condemnation. Some 
jurisdictions draw the self-defense doctrine's "imminence" require­
ment tighter than others, spelling the difference between conviction 
and acquittal for women who kill their abusive husbands in the 
quiet eye of the violent storm. Drawing the requirement tighter, 
however, does not signify that all who thereby are convicted are 
morally deficient by society's standards.47 
In all of the foregoing situations, criminal law commits the very 
sin that Hart imputed to strict liability. It sacrifices moral precision, 
putting the lie to Hart's claim that the principle of individualized 
moral blameworthiness is immovable criminal law bedrock. More­
over, when criminal law sacrifices moral precision, it is not for want 
product of the free exercise of conscious volition; it is excluding, in a crude kind of way, 
conduct that in any view is not." HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CruMINAL SANC· 
TION 76 (1968). 
44. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). 
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 383 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass. 1978) (following the 
standard proposed by the Model Penal Code that permits acquittal by reason of insanity 
where, due to mental disease or defect, a defendant lacks substantial capacity either to appre· 
ciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform that conduct to the 
requirements of the law); Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 272 (Va. 1974) (permitting 
acquittal by reason of insanity when mental disease prevents a defendant from controlling his 
conduct, the so-called "irresistible impulse" test). 
46. See IDAHO CooE § 18-207 (1997); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1997); UTAH 
CooE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (1995). For a discussion of the experience in Montana, see Rita D. 
Buitendorp, Note, A Statutory Lesson from "Big Sky Country" on Abolishing the Insanity 
Defense, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 965 (1996). For a discussion of the factors that might lead to 
abolition of the insanity defense, including factors other than moral blameworthiness, see 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, REnnNKING CruMINAL LAW 845-46 (1978) (discussing the "proce­
dural skepticism" to which some critics of the insanity defense subscribe - skepticism "that 
responds to the image of protracted trials, conflicting testimony by partisan experts, and the 
sheer burden of trying to assess whether a particular individual lacked capacity to be held 
accountable for a criminal act," as well as to "the claim that the defense is often 'abused' "). 
47. Compare State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (denying a battered spouse's 
claim of self-defense for lack of imminence, and observing that a less stringent formulation of 
the imminence requirement would disserve general deterrence objectives and might invite 
erroneous acquittals) with State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (adopting a less 
stringent formulation of the imminence requirement and permitting a battered woman's 
claim of self-defense to reach the jury). See generally Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, 
Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371 (1993) (discussing 
competing formulations of the imminence requirement and advocating the more lenient 
one). 
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of an alternative. In each instance just noted, the law could give 
juries the freedom to make finer appraisals of blameworthiness 
under more general standards, or it could shift the margins of its 
rules to exclude from liability the close cases that just barely sup­
port conviction under the prevailing rules, or it could fashion a deci­
sional structure that combines the two. Nor does the law make this 
sacrifice of moral precision on the shallow basis that "the probable, 
or even the certain, guilt of nine men [is] sufficient warrant for the 
conviction of the tenth," or even on the theory that the tenth him­
self was or is deterrable.48 Stated in Hart's own terms, criminal law 
sacrifices moral precision because it must serve a "complex of insti­
tutional ends ... as well as a complex of substantive social ends," 
and because "none may be thought of as wholly excluding the 
others."49 For better or worse, criminal law frequently and deliber­
ately forgoes the additional moral precision that would bring the 
tenth man his salvation in order to control its juries and keep its 
trials manageable, to ensure that outcomes appear consistent and 
not the product of prejudice, sympathy, whim, or the art of jury 
selection, and to prevent false acquittals that reward favored de­
fendants or finessed defenses from becoming the order of the day 
to the detriment of general deterrence goals and the respectability 
of criminal law itself. Criminal law surely aspires to punish only the 
individually blameworthy. But to say that it guarantees as much, 
that it never trades off moral precision for other values, is to deny 
the structural reality.so 
In pointing out the similarity between strict liability crimes and 
other line-drawing choices in criminal law, I do not deny that there 
48. Hart, supra note 1, at 422-23 (attributing such justifications to strict liability and then 
ridiculing them). 
49. Id. at 401-02. 
50. Tue reader will note that each of the examples of moral imprecision discussed - to 
which we can add public-welfare strict-liability offenses, the use of strict liability elements in 
cases like Prince and Mash, see supra notes 37-38, and the maxim that ignorance of the law is 
no excuse - involve all-or-nothing consequences for the individual. Defendants who fall just 
inside of the law's rules of decision are guilty notwithstanding their moral blamelessness, 
whereas defendants who fall just to the outside are acquitted. Legislative decisions that des­
ignate a matter that is relevant to criminal responsibility an affirmative defense rather than 
an element of the crime, thereby shifting the burden of proof from the government to the 
defendant, have a similar effect; the maneuver presupposes moral imprecision, and it is un­
dertaken precisely because it will limit acquittals to more clear-cut cases of moral 
blamelessness. 
Tue fact that criminal law does not adhere to Hart's principle of moral blameworthiness is 
thrown into still further relief when attention is turned from these all-or-nothing doctrinal 
lines and focused instead on the many lines that are drawn to grade punishment. Were the 
system really committed to circumspection in the matter of blameworthiness, for example, it 
long ago would have renounced the felony murder rule, as well as the crabbed categorical 
treatment of the heat-of-passion doctrine. 
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are differences between them. Strict liability crimes represent a leg­
islative determination that the actors and conduct falling within 
their ambit are by some probability blameworthy, but that 
probability could be considerably lower than, for example, the 
probability that all defendants who kill in circumstances of claimed 
necessity are genuinely blameworthy by the full measure of soci­
ety's moral calculus. Strict liability crimes also leave considerably 
less room for moral input from lay jurors in response to the actual 
facts of the case; the moral judgment of fault is prescribed by the 
legislature by definition, with the jury's role confined to determin­
ing whether the conduct and circumstantial elements of the offense 
are satisfied.51 In terms of individual blameworthiness, then, strict 
liability may be more overinclusive both in fact and appearance 
than are the various forms of interplay between liability rules and 
defense rules examined above. A general objection to strict liabil­
ity on this ground is fair enough, but also fairly weak. Strict liability 
comes in different shapes and sizes, and there is no reason in theory 
why a strict-liability crime cannot be tailored to reduce its overin­
clusiveness to a level of acceptability comparable, for example, to 
the hoary but durable maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
Unless we are to prohibit legislatures from ever using the tool 
merely because it might be used poorly on some jobs, the "too 
overinclusive" objection fails at the general level and must move to 
the case-specific level. And whether raised across the board or case 
by case, the objection still begs two important questions. If the 
problem is the degree of overinclusiveness, why should a legislative 
decision to adopt strict liability not be respected as a conscientious 
determination that the overinclusiveness is acceptable? When��if 
ever, does that not settle the matter insofar as constitutional law is 
concerned? 
It would have been fascinating to watch Henry Hart direct his 
considerable talents to the pursuit of answers to those questions, 
and to the associated questions about the institutional competence 
and structural roles of legislators, judges, and jurors that lurk be­
neath them.52 But Hart sidestepped such a process-sensitive inves-
51. See Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIME AND JusnCE 1512, 1517 { Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (noting that strict liability may 
be equated with a "rule-like" form of negligence); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in 
the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731, 744 {1960) (noting similarly). 
52. To accept Hart's "central thesis" that the criminal sanction is "misused when it is • . .  
applied to conduct which is not blameworthy," Hart, supra note 1, at 405 n.13, takes us only 
so far, and right into the question: Not blameworthy according to whom and by what process 
of decision? By ruling out strict liability and insisting on individual moral blameworthiness, 
Hart's answer is that the jury must decide. But why should - let alone must - the jury's 
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tigation altogether when he instead sought to indict strict liability 
for abridging a fundamental substantive principle. Strict liability's 
crime, Hart alleged, was an offense to the principle that it is imper­
missible to "condemn[ ] and punish[ ] a human being as a criminal 
when he has done nothing which is blameworthy" - or, in other 
words, the crime of deliberate overinclusiveness.53 Only by ignor­
ing the deliberate overinclusiveness embedded throughout criminal 
law, only by glossing over the occasions when the law draws the line 
tight and thus condemns and punishes the blameless along with the 
rest, only by eleva�ing one of the law's many competing aspirations 
into a fundamental substantive rule, could this be considered a 
crime against the criminal law. Criminal law is not nearly so perfect 
or self-disciplined. 
2. Generalizing the Perfect Substantive Constitution 
Hart's quest for a substantive right that would impugn strict lia­
bility took him on a circuitous trip through criminal law that by­
passed questions of process Hart might have been expected to stop 
and savor. The journey grew still more circuitous on its second leg, 
when Hart arrived at the Constitution itself. 
This second leg of Hart's argument involved an effort to locate 
in the Constitution the same fundamental principle of individual­
ized moral blameworthiness that he claimed to find in criminal law. 
While he proposed that courts could invoke the "broad constitu-
decision be preferred over the legislature's? Hart never really tells us. As Richard 
Wasserstrom pointed out a few years after Hart published The Aims of the Criminal Law, the 
answer is not self-evident. "To the extent that strict liability statutes can be interpreted as 
legislative judgments that conduct which produces or permits certain consequences is unrea­
sonable, strict criminal liability is similar to a jury determination that conduct in a particular 
case was unreasonable." Wasserstrom, supra note 51, at 744; see also Kelman, supra note 51. 
Legislatures surely are competent to make serious and conscientious moral judgments on 
society's behalf, and they do so whenever they enact a strict liability statute. As Wasserstrom 
explains: 
While few persons would seriously wish to maintain that the legislature is either omnis­
cient or a wholly adequate reflection of general or popular sentiment, the fact that so 
many legislatures have felt such apparently little compunction over enacting such [strict­
liability] statutes is surely indicative of the presence of a comparable community 
conviction. 
Wasserstrom, supra note 51, at 741. To be sure, arguments can be made for preferring some 
jury role in the assignment of blame. The jury brings a perspective to particular facts that the 
legislature cannot. See PACKER, supra note 43, at 128 (noting that "the legislature cannot and 
does not foresee the infinite variation of circumstance that may affect the jury's view of a 
particular case"); Wasserstrom, supra note 51, at 744. Jury participation also might serve 
structural political ends. See Ann Hopkins, Comment, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by 
Jury, 76 CAL. L. REv. 391 (1988). By the same token, however, arguments can be made for 
preferring the broadly representative and politically accountable judgment of the legislature. 
53. Hart, supra note 1, at 422. 
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tional injunction of due process" to invalidate strict liability,s4 Hart 
did not rest with the narrow argument that his preferred principle 
had achieved due process fundamentality merely by historical and 
traditional acceptance - a claim that would accord with the due 
process methodology of the time5s but that, as we have just seen, 
has problems on the merits. Hart looked past the Due Process 
Clause and saw an even more perfect Constitution as a whole. If 
only judges would open their eyes to the "unmistakable indications 
that the Constitution means something definite and something seri­
ous when it speaks of 'crime,' "56 they would see that the principle 
of individualized blameworthiness permeates the entire document 
- that it is "the understanding embodied" in the Constitution,57 or, 
as Hart's Legal Process School colleague Herbert Wechsler might 
have labeled it a year later, a "neutral principle" of constitutional 
law.58 
The "unmistakable indications" Hart had in mind were the Con­
stitution's various allusions to' crime - provisions that establish 
procedural safeguards to be observed in the investigation and pros­
ecution of crime but which, in the main, do not purport to erect 
substantive limitations.59 None of these provisions comes close to 
an explicit declaration that government's power to define crimes 
should be circumscribed by the likes of Hart's principle of individ­
ual blameworthiness, but Hart got around that in much the same 
way Justice William Douglas got around a similar snag a few years 
54. Id. at 411. 
55. See Kadish, supra note 31. 
56. Hart, supra note 1, at 431. 
57. See id. at 404. .. ,"-
58. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 13 HAav. L. 
REv. 1 (1959). 
59. Hart cited the following provisions: U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (limiting the sanction 
for impeachment to removal from office and disqualification and providing that further sanc­
tions of a criminal nature require observance of criminal trial safeguards); U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 2 (limiting suspension of the writ of habeas corpus); U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 
(barring Congress from enacting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws); U.S. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1 (barring states from enacting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws); U.S. CoNST. 
art. ill, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring a jury trial and prescribing venue in federal criminal prosecu­
tions); U.S. CoNST. art. m, § 3 (regulating treason prosecutions); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 
2 (providing for extradition); U.S. CoNST. amend. IV (regulating searches and seizures); U.S. 
CoNST. amend. V (requiring grand juries in federal prosecutions, guarding against double 
jeopardy, protecting the privilege against self-incrimination, and requiring observance of due 
process); U.S. CoNST. amend. VI (extending the rights to counsel, speedy and public trial by 
jury, local venue, notice, compulsory process, and confrontation of witnesses); U.S. CoNST. 
amend. vm (prohibiting excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments); 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII (barring involuntary servitude save as punishment for crime); U.S. 
CoNST. amend. XIV (providing for due process and equal protection). See Hart, supra note 
1, at 404 n.12. Of the foregoing, Hart regarded the prohibition against ex post facto laws as 
"the only important express substantive limitation." Id. at 411 n.27. 
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later in Griswold v. Connecticut.60 The constitutional text, Hart 
urgep, should be read to imply a richer and more powerful general 
concept behind the specific conceptions it explicitly addresses, one 
that judges are not only free but in fact obligated to tap and en­
force.61 Indeed, Hart went so far as to suggest that the "implicit 
assumptions" behind the Constitution's text can be "more impres­
sive than any explicit assertions" to the same effect, at least in the 
case of its criminal procedure provisions.62 Hart read those provi­
sions to indicate that "crime is a distinctive and serious matter - a 
something, and not a nothing."63 As such, they cry out for a sub­
stantive unifying concept. Out of the penumbras formed by the em­
anations of the Constitution's criminal procedure provisions 
emerges the concept of individual blameworthiness. 
For our purposes, the most striking aspect of Hart's argument is 
the assumption upon which it depends for all of its strength: that 
the Constitution's procedural preoccupation with crime is much ado 
about "nothing" if that same Constitution does not also establish a 
substantive limitation on the definition of crime. To say the least, 
the assumption is contestable, yet Hart never rose to defend it. By 
never defending it - by depending instead on the sheer seductive­
ness of a substantive theory - Hart managed to avoid confronting 
basic questions about the interrelationships among the Constitu­
tion, the criminal law, the political process, and the legal process. 
Why can an intelligent constitution not be ambidextrous, passing 
with one hand the substantive determination of what conduct mer­
its punishment as "crime" to the people and their political process, 
even as it uses the other to lay down procedural standards for the 
investigations and prosecutions that bring the punishment to bear 
in individual cases? The Constitution's text surely can b�ar that in­
terpretation, and an appeal to the original understanding will not 
refute it.64 If the problem is that the legislature might administer 
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a general constitutional right to privacy, sufficiently 
broad to protect the right of married couples to use contraception, in the penumbras formed 
by the emanations from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights). See generally Paul G. 
Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: 
The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965). 
61. Hart did not use the terms "concept" and "conception" as such. These are borrowed 
from Dworkin. See RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). 
62. See Hart, supra note 1, at 404. 
63. Hart, supra note 1, at 404; see also id. at 411 n.27 (inviting courts to look past the 
particular evils captured by the Ex Post Facto Clauses and to identify in them some broader 
and more general "principles of just punishment [that are] implicit in such clauses [and which 
would] have relevance in other situations"). 
64. Some contemporary legislative judgments about what merits punishment doubtless 
would look unfamiliar to 18th- or 19th-century eyes, but that does not mean our constitu-
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punishment that does not agree with the public's sense of justice -
that it might indulge in excessively overinclusive rules - why are 
political safeguards not sufficient? If the answer is that momentary 
passions might overcome elected legislators, making the interven­
tion of politically insulated judges a desirable thing, what of the 
countervailing observation that those theoretically insulated judges 
are elites who easily confuse their own elitist views for the sense of 
justice held by the public as a whole?65 If the answer instead is that 
individual defendants should not be made to suffer while a political 
correction is pending, but the law's rules are temporarily out of sync 
with the public's sense of justice, why are the various discretionary 
institutional safeguards built into the criminal justice system -
prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification, sentencing discretion, 
and executive clemency - not sufficient to mitigate that harm? 
And while on the subject of those institutional safeguards, does 
their general availability not rob the constitutional (and policy and 
moral) objection to overinclusive criminal law rules of much of its 
tional ancestors intended to deny future generations the power to identify and meet the 
needs of a society the framers could not foresee. The rise and fall of Lochner-style substan­
tive due process should have taught us the perils of confusing the unfamiliar with the 
unconstitutional. 
Professor William Stuntz recently has sought to justify a substantive constitutional crimi­
nal law as faithful to, or at least not wholly unfaithful to, original intent. Stuntz's argument 
begins with the observation that the Constitution's criminal procedure provisions began as 
indirect means of guarding against certain undesirable substantive outcomes. See William J. 
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396-419 (1995). 
From that premise, Stuntz goes on to suggest in a later article that it is therefore appropriate 
to constitutionalize various unwritten substantive limitations upon the criminal sanction, that 
doing so is in keeping with the general spirit of the document because substantive concerns 
helped to inspire the document's procedural protections, and that in fact "[w]e need limits on 
criminal substance to make criminal procedure mean something." See Stuntz, supra note 11, 
at 40-41. Although the argument makes a nice stab at justifying the practice of perfectionist 
generalizing on what look like originalism grounds, Stuntz's willingness to read new substan­
tive limitations into the Constitution that are quite unrelated to the substantive evils that 
gave rise to the document's procedural protections suggests, to my mind, an argument that at 
bottom is every bit as adventurous, and suspect, as Hart's. 
65. The danger of judicial bias would seem particularly pronounced in the context of 
strict liability crimes, for so many of these crimes mean to take issue with, and alter the 
behavior of, the social elites with whom judges are most inclined to identify. See, e.g., Mark 
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 610 
(1981) (noting that "[o]ne can view th[e] attack on strict liability as a simple class-biased, 
result-oriented defense of corporate managers" and that "the bulk of strict liability crimes 
are regulatory crimes which . . .  are most likely to be committed by those who con[t]rol the 
means of production"). 
In this connection, there is some telling and unintended irony in Hart's argument. To 
support his contention that strict liability saps criminal law of its moral force, Hart pointed to 
occasions when judges have felt the need to depreciate the significance of a criminal convic­
tion in the course of validating strict liability. See Hart, supra note 1, at 423 n.57. Why these 
instances of judicial wrist-slapping argue for a greater constitutional role for judges in the 
definition of crime is not readily apparent. They just as easily support a charge that judges 
are much too subjective and countermajoritarian already - injecting their own beliefs that X 
is not blameworthy when the people, through their legislature, have determined otherwise. 
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force?66 It is true that neither the political safeguards nor the insti­
tutional safeguards are fail-safe, nor are they perfect in combina­
tion. But if, when all is said and done, the trouble is that the 
safeguards are imperfect, why is that a constitutional problem? 
Since when has "due" process meant "perfect" process? Even if we 
suppose that there is room for constitutional improvement, why is a 
substantive constitutional trump card in the hands of the judiciary 
the answer? Might that not introduce a whole new set of constitu­
tional troubles that dwarf whatever benefits we might hope to 
gain?67 Might there not be an alternative, process-oriented role for 
the judiciary that is calculated to reinforce and strengthen the polit­
ical and institutional safeguards and, conversely, to intervene when 
there are particular reasons to think they are failing? 
By posing these questions, I do not mean to suggest that a case 
cannot be made for a substantive, constitutional, �nd judicially en­
forceable limitation on the legislative power to define crime. I pose 
them only to show that the case is not nearly as convincing or inevi­
table as Hart made it seem by skirting such questions. 68 
66. See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, "Innocence" - A Dialogue with Professor Sundby, 41 
HAsnNas LJ. 153, 160 (1989) (noting that the existence of such safeguards suggests that "a 
legislative choice to eliminate a culpability element from the definition of an offense does not 
mean that culpability is being ignored," but rather "only that the particular culpability issue is 
to be weighed at a different stage and in a different manner"). Indeed, these discretionary 
institutional safeguards would seem to be their most trustworthy in the very cases that Hart 
finds most distressing: those involving the application of strict liability to a pillar of the com­
munity who has done his best to comply with an onerous statutory duty, or to an average Joe 
engaged in normal, everyday activities. If anyone can be expected to reap the benefits of 
prosecutorial discretion, it is the former. If anyone can be expected to reap the benefits of 
jury nullification, it is the latter. 
· 67. Hart did not begin to explore the countermajoritarian consequences of his thesis -
which, given the class implications of much strict liability legislation, would seem profound. 
See supra note 65. What is more, Hart fudged exactly how judges should play the substantive 
trump card he claimed that the Constitution has dealt them. In the main, Hart appeared to 
argue that the judiciary should find in the Constitution a categorical ban against strict liability 
crimes - in essence, a bright line rule of mens rea that would guard prophylactically against 
failures of the legislature's sense of justice and vest juries with more authority to appraise the 
personal moral blameworthiness of defendants. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 1, at 422-25. At 
other points in his article, however, Hart seemed prepared to tolerate overinclusive, morally 
imprecise criminal law rules so long as a judge does not find them to be problematically 
overinclusive. See, e.g., id. at 418 (accepting the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse 
even as to newly defined criminal laws, provided that they are "well-considered additions to 
the list of the citizen's basic legal obligations"). 
68. Although Hart never squarely addressed these questions in The Aims of the Criminal 
Law, he twice came close to confronting them in his article. Each time, he poured on the 
rhetoric as he sidestepped them, launching a biting ad hominem attack against anyone who 
might argue that substantive legislative judgments ought to control, see id. at 404 (remarking 
that "[s]o vacant a concept is a betrayal of intellectual bankruptcy"), and dismissing the rele­
vance of discretionary institutional safeguards witli a high-handed and highly misleading 
brush-off, see id. at 424 (criticizing the "arrogant assertion that it is proper to visit the moral 
condemnation of the community upon one of its members on the basis solely of the private 
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3. Razing the Precedent 
Perhaps the one-sidedness in Hart's pitch for a substantive con­
stitutional criminal law can be chalked up to adversarial hard­
selling. Experienced judges know it well - the lawyer's argument 
that moves with supreme confidence and acknowledges no weak­
ness except to rebut those raised by the opposition. Hart sorely 
tested the limits, however, in the third and final step of his constitu­
tional argument, in which he had to reckon with Supreme Court 
precedent that stood in the way of his substantive quest. It is here 
that Hart the advocate overwhelmed Hart the objective scholar. 
The result would not have been so damaging to the scholarly devel­
opment of the relationship between the Constitution and criminal 
law, we shall see, were it not for the academy's inclination to re­
ceive Hart's pronouncements as gospel truth rather than adversarial 
spin.69 
The precedent in question consisted of seven Supreme Court 
decisions, spanning almost half a century, that accepted the consti­
tutionality of strict liability by dictum or by holding.70 These cases 
depict a less perfect and less substantive Constitution than Hart's 
argument demanded and left little room for Hart's principle of indi­
vidual blameworthiness. Faced with such precedent, Hart had two 
options. He could concede the basic validity of the precedent and 
seek modest progress by fashioning a constitutional role for the 
Court that honors the precedent but nonetheless might move crimi­
nal law in the general substantive direction he desired,71 or he could 
trash the precedent and shoot for substantive perfection. 
judgment of his prosecutors," but failing to acknowledge the fact that criminality never at­
taches "solely" on that basis). 
Within that rhetoric, no doubt, lies the foundation for a more elaborate response - one 
that Hart did not undertake to develop - that would target the difficulties with discretionary 
institutional safeguards and assert a corresponding imperative for a judicially enforceable 
"neutral principle." See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making 
of the Legal Process, 107 HAR.v. L. REv. 2031, 2048 (1994) (noting that Hart and like-minded 
scholars "were centrally concerned with the control of discretion" and therefore "designated 
the judiciary as the guardians of rule-of-law values and envisioned the duty of judges to be 
the 'reasoned elaboration' of 'neutral principles' and legislative 'purposes"' (footnotes omit­
ted)). How Hart would handle the objection that his principle of moral blameworthiness, as 
he proposed it to be enforced by judges, proves too much to be "neutral,'' see supra notes 52, 
65, 67 and accompanying text, and partakes too much of Lochner-style jurisprudence, see 
infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text, we do not know. 
69. See infra notes 108-09, 114 and accompanying text 
70. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246 {1952); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Behrman, 258 
U.S. 280 (1922); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Johnson, 221 
U.S. 488 (1911); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910). 
71. That approach is available, but it requires thinking about the Court's role in process­
oriented rather than substance-oriented terms. See infra Part II. 
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Hart trashed. The genesis of the Supreme Court's affirmation 
of strict liability in the 1910 decision in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. 
Minnesota, 72 Hart declared, was a moment of "impatience, and cor­
responding lack of hard thinking" on the part of the Justices that 
produced dictum to the audacious effect that a crime is anything 
which the legislature chooses to say it is.73 During the following 
year, Oliver Wendell Holmes made matters worse for Hart in 
United States v. Johnson74 with similar dictum of his own, in a ges­
ture Hart characterized as "wholly nude of supporting authority."75 
Eleven years later, Chief Justice (and former President) William 
Howard Taft made "manifestly cavalier use of [the] dictum as con­
trolling authority"76 to flatly uphold strict liability in the 1922 deci­
sion in United States v. Balint. 77 On the very same day that Balint 
came down, Justice William R. Day's opinion for the Court in 
United States v. Behrman78 exacerbated the error by following the 
Chief Justice's scarcely dry holding.79 The next culprit was Felix 
Frankfurter, who authored the 1943 decision in United States v. 
72. 218 U.S. 57 (1910) . .  
73. See Hart, supra note 1, at 432-33 n.71 (characterizing Shevlin-Carpenter). Justice 
McKenna's dictum in Shevlin-Carpenter read as follows: 
It is true that the police power of a State is the least limitable of its powers, but even it 
may not transcend the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States . . • .  The 
Supreme Court of the State . . .  decided that the legislation was in effect an exercise of 
the police power, and cited a number of cases to sustain the proposition that public 
policy may require that in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts it may be 
provided that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to 
plead in defense good faith or ignorance. Those cases are set forth in the opinion of the 
court, and some of them reviewed. 
We will not repeat them. It was recognized that such legislation may, in particular 
instances, be harsh, but we can only say again what we have so often said, that this court 
cannot set aside legislation because it is harsh. 
Shevlin-Carpenter, 218 U.S. at 69-70. This is dictum, but it is not quite so off-the-cuff as 
Hart's dismissive characterization would suggest. Justice McKenna clearly saw the definition 
of crime as a debatable issue of public policy best left to the political process under tradi­
tional constitutional understandings of the appropriate roles of legislatures and courts respec­
tively. His contention drew not a single dissent from the rest of the Court. 
74. 221 U.S. 488 (1911). 
75. Hart, supra note 1, at 433 n.71 (characterizing Johnson). Holmes's dictum came as he 
interpreted the federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 to criminalize the shipment of a mis­
branded article even though it might be misbranded ''without any conscious fraud at all." See 
Johnson, 221 U.S. at 497. Holmes reasoned that "[i]t was natural enough to throw this risk 
on shippers with regard to the identity of their wares." See Johnson, 221 U.S. at 497-98. 
76. Hart, supra note 1, at 433 n.72 (characterizing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 
(1922)). 
77. 258 U.S. 250 (1922). Hart found further reason to fault Taft for "only" citing, in 
addition to Shevlin-Carpenter, "some state court cases, some lower federal court cases, and 
two English cases." Hart, supra note 1, at 433 n.72. 
78. 258 U.S. 280 (1922). 
79. See Hart, supra note 1, at 433 n.72 (characterizing Behrman). 
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Dotterweich. 8° Frankfurter followed Taft's holding in Balint uncriti­
cally, "treating the whole matter as a fait accompli" and thereby 
producing "one of the most drastic of the Court's decisions" in the 
line:81 Thereafter, two cases with pleasant results in Hart's estima­
tion - Morissette v. United States82 and Lambert v. California83 -
needlessly worsened the situation with further dicta reaffirming the 
general constitutionality of strict liability.84 Hart summarized the 
line of cases thusly: "From beginning to end, there is scarcely a 
single opinion by any member of the Court which confronts the 
question in a fashion which deserves intellectual respect."85 
The problem with Hart's stentorian attack on Supreme Court 
precedent is not his dim assessment of the quality of the Court's 
intellectual work product.86 The problem is that a Court careless 
with its craft might nonetheless be a Court with valid and weighty 
concerns on its mind. So, I submit, was the Court that wended its 
way from Balint to Dotterweich, Morissette, and Lambert, and the 
valid and weighty concerns on its mind had everything to do with 
process. But Hart's strategy prohibited him from acknowledging 
even the possibility that this might be so. He was dead set on 
80. 320 U. S. 277 (1943). 
81. Hart supra note 1, at 433 (characterizing DotterWeich). Hart never explained how a 
fait accompli differs from stare decisis. 
82. 342 U. S. 246 (1952). 
83. 355 U. S. 225 (1957). 
84. See Hart, supra note 1, at 431-32 n.70 (criticizing Morissette); id. at 434 (criticizing 
Lambert). 
85. Id. at 431 (footnote omitted). Hart acknowledged that Justice Robert H. Jackson's 
exhaustive and oft-cited opinion in Morissette might qualify for an exception to his summary 
dismissal of the Court's intellectual work product. For Justice Jackson, however, it was a case 
of "damned-if-you-don't, damned-if-you-do." Hart took him to task for writing a "spread­
eag]e dissertation" that said more to dispose of the case than Hart thought necessary -
which is to say that it acknowledged and respected the precedent laid down by the Court. 
See id. at 431-32 n.70. 
86. Back in Hart's day, when terseness was the fashion in Supreme Court opinions and 
the turnaround time between oral argument and the issuance of an opinion might be a matter 
of weeks rather than months, chiding the Justices for shoddy craftsmanship became a popular 
parlor game in the academy. Hart's demonstration in The Aims of the Criminal Law was 
vintage, but he saved his definitive performance for the Harvard Law Review a year later. 
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the 
· Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 100-01 (1959) (faulting the Court for "inadequately reasoned 
opinion[s]" and suggesting that they are the product of a "Court [that] is trying to decide 
more cases than it can decide well"). For a sense of how other scholars played the game, see 
l'Hn.IP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CoNSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 91 (1970) 
(suggesting that "one can be among the ardent admirers of the Court and still concede the 
defects of its opinion-writing"); Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative 
Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1957) 
(arguing that "[t]he Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dog­
matic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to support 
them in reason, in sum, of opinions that do not opine"). 
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breaking the ground for a substantive constitutional criminal law, 
and that required razing the precedent. Crediting that precedent 
with an arguable foundation, let alone a foundation poured from 
process rather than substance, was simply out of the question. 
Tb.us, the cases were lampooned in their worst light, and, for the 
third time, Hart sidestepped an encounter with the Constitution 
and criminal law in process terms. 
To illustrate, consider the much-maligned Dotterweich case, in 
which a closely divided Court upheld the strict liability conviction 
of a corporate executive under the federal Food, Drug, and Cos­
metic Act of 1938.s7 We may agree with Hart that Justice 
Frankfurter's majority opinion regarded the constitutionality of 
strict liability as a fait accompli. We might even concede that 
Frankfurter blew the case on statutory interpretation grounds, and 
that reasoned elaboration of the law suffered a setback when 
Frankfurter passed up the opportunity to establish an interpretive 
presumption against strict liability in the absence of clear legislative 
directive.ss But we really must object when we get to Hart's protes­
tation that "Frankfurter's [Dotterweich] opinion disposes of the 
problem in a curt half paragraph, citing only the Balint case . . .  and 
Holmes' dictum in United States v. Johnson."s9 The unvarnishe'd 
truth is that Frankfurter's opinion had a good bit more to say about 
the problem of strict liability. If you read the opinion with only a 
modicum of charity and with attention to its important concluding 
paragraphs that Hart neglected, you will see that Frankfurter was 
defending the Court's acceptance of strict liability and that his de­
fense reflected a strongly process-oriented understanding of the 
Constitution's relationship with the criminal law. 
87. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
88. It was on the question of statutory interpretation that the Justices divided. Justice 
Murphy's dissent, joined by Justices Roberts, Reed, and Rutledge, took no issue with the 
constitutionality of strict liability but argued that a mens rea element should be inferred in 
the absence of a "clear and unambiguous" legislative mandate for strict liability. See 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Frankfurter, joined by Chief Justice 
Stone and Justices Black, Douglas, and Jackson, did not deny the role of lenity in the inter­
pretation of criminal statutes but urged that "[l]iteralism and evisceration are equally to be 
avoided." 320 U.S. at 284; see also 320 U.S. at 283 (suggesting that "we free our minds from 
the notion that criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial and conventional rule" 
(quoting United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55 (1909))). 
The statutory-interpretation shortcomings of Frankfurter's opinion also seem to have 
been the main beef for Hart. See Hart, supra note 1, at 431-32 n.70,' 434 n.73. The Court's 
recent solicitude for mens rea in cases arising from legislation subject to interpretation, see, 
e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 
(1985), suggests that the dissenters and Hart may have had the stronger point. 
89. Hart, supra note 1, at 433 n.73 (citations omitted). 
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Although Frankfurter's defense was scattered throughout the 
Dotterweich opinion, it is not difficult to piece together. There were 
four key points, with the first three devoted to situating strict liabil­
ity in the appropriate perspective. The defense begins with a basic 
articulation of the strict liability problem - which Frankfurter put 
forth with more precision and less substantive top spin than Hart. 
According to Frankfurter, the real trouble with strict liability is not 
that it dispenses with blameworthiness altogether,90 but that its leg­
islatively enacted rule-based generalization of blameworthiness is 
overinclusive.91 Frankfurter's second point sought to explain why a 
modem policymaker reasonably and conscientiously might con­
clude that strict liability, despite its overinclusiveness, was worth 
employing. As Chief Justice Taft noted in Balint, the criminal sanc­
tion is an instrument for securing the betterment of society, and its 
use in a world of increasing complexity draws into question a multi­
plicity of competing values and objectives.92 Working from that 
premise, Frankfurter envisioned that "the circumstances of modem 
industrialism"93 could generate new threats to the public welfare 
for which a strict liability crime might seem the fairest and most 
effective response. A less stringent or more lenient regulatory mea­
sure conceivably might fail to stimulate the serious attention to duty 
necessary to protect innocent and relatively helpless citizens from 
harm, making strict liability at least arguably the preferred option 
from among an imperfect set of altematives.94 Frankfurter's third 
point suggests a further reason to uphold legislative discretion to 
choose the overinclusive legal rule of strict liability over a more le­
nient but underprotective form of regulation. Criminal law is not a 
closed system of legal rules that autonomously apply themselves to 
their full definitional reach. It is a process that relies on institu-
90. Hart made that hyperbolic assertion. See id. at 422. 
91. As Frankfurter put it, "[h]ardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus 
penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting." 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. 
92. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922). Ironically enough, this is 
substantially the same proposition with which Hart opened The Aims of the Criminal Law. 
See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
93. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280. By stressing modem industrialism, Frankfurter invited a 
contrast with the simpler homogeneous society that had produced the garden-variety crimi­
nal law that Sayre, two decades earlier, had noted. The "modem conception of criminality," 
Sayre observed, has involved a "shifting from a basis of individual guilt to one of social 
danger" that seems "inevitable." See Sayre, supra note 16, at 55, 67. 
94. A strict legislatively prescribed duty might be necessary to encourage the utmost care 
in certain settings. See Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53. Imprisonment, rather than a fine, might be 
necessary to prevent actors in industry and commerce from ignoring the duty and paying the 
fine instead, treating it as a license fee. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 282-83. 
March 1998] Substantive Constitutional Criminal Law 1293 
tional actors with discretion to nip and tuck the application of the 
rules to ameliorate their harshness, their moral imprecision, and 
their overinclusiveness. "Our system of criminal justice necessarily 
depends on 'conscience and circumspection in prosecuting of­
ficers,' "95 Frankfurter stressed, and "the ultimate judgment of ju­
ries must be trusted" as well.96 When discretionary institutional 
safeguards are factored into the equation, strict liability's theoreti­
cal imperfections do not disappear, but they do lose some of their 
provocativeness.97 
Having placed the issue in perspective, Frankfurter turned 
fourth and finally to the fundamental constitutional question of 
who decides what is criminal. Frankfurter's answer was that in a 
multivalued world of multiple objectives and imperfect alternatives, 
the legislature and not the judiciary is the institution competent to 
conduct the necessary "[b]alancing [of] relative hardships."98 
Frankfurter did not bother to elaborate, but in context his point was 
perfectly clear. At the time of the Dotterweich decision in 1943, the 
Court had only recently repudiated the judicial efforts of the 
Lochner era to guard against supposed failures of the "legislature's 
sense of justice"99 in the regulation of modem socioeconomic 
problems. The Court had observed a jurisprudence in which judges 
purported to find substantive, judicially enforceable limitations on 
the legislative power of the people in the "unmistakable indica­
tions"100 of selected indeterminate constitutional clauses, or in "the 
95. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 
(1913)). Frankfurter went on to note that reliance upon prosecutorial discretion is necessary 
"even when the consequences are far more drastic than they are under the provision of law 
before us." See 320 U.S. at 285 (citing Balint, 258 U.S. 250, which involved a maximum 
sentence of five years imprisonment). 
96. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285. Earlier in the opinion, and in a different connection, 
Frankfurter made the point that jiirles are free to play the equities in their decisionmaking. 
See 320 U.S. at 279 ("Juries may indulge in precisely such motives or vagaries."). 
97. Frankfurter acknowledged what Frederick Schauer later identified as the problem of 
the "recalcitrant experience" - the fact that rules have the capacity to dictate results in 
application that would be contrary to the justifications underlying them. See FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY nm RuLES: A Pmr.osoPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 38-39 (1991). Here, in the case of strict liability, the 
problem arises because of the probabilistic generalization that the rule embodies. 
One way that criminal law alleviates recalcitrant experiences is by establishing separate 
"decisional rules" that mitigate the harshness that would result were its "conduct rules" to 
control the outcome of a prosecution. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct 
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HAR.v. L. REv. 625 (1984). What 
Frankfurter realized is that discretionary judgment figures into the alleviation process as well, 
resolving some of the recalcitrant experiences that decisional rules produce. 
98. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285; see also Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 
U.S. 57, 70 (1910) (noting that "this court cannot set aside legislation because it is harsh"). 
99. Hart, supra note 1, at 411. 
100. Id. at 431. 
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broad constitutional injunction of due process,"101 or in the "under­
standing embodied"102 by, but never stated in, the Constitution. 
The Court had experienced the consequences of such a jurispru­
dence: the ease with which judges can mistake the unfamiliar or the 
personally unsettling for the unconstitutional, thwarting good gov­
�rnment and, worse, self-government. Having succeeded, after a 
long struggle, to renounce that business only six years earlier,103 the 
Court was not about to reenter it in Dotterweich. 
. Within Dotterweich, then, lies a coherent, process-oriented and 
institution-sensitive model of the relationship between the Consti­
tution and criminal law. Criminal law choices are controvertible, 
fundamentally political, and thus best left to the political depart­
ments.104 There indeed is a risk that criminal law might drift too far 
from its moral moorings. Our chief protection against that risk, 
however, comes not from Platonic guardians, but from the safe­
gi,iards of the political process and the opportunities for individual­
ized, discretionary justice that are layered institutionally throughout 
the criminal process.105 Imperfect? Undoubtedly. But with 
Platonic guardians in .short supply, it is quite possibly safer than the 
alternative. 
Those were the Court's terms. Hart never directly confronted 
them. Nor, for that matter, would the scholars who followed in his 
wake. 
C. Hart's Wake: Substantive Theorizing in the Academy 
Once Henry Hart pushed process considerations to the side and 
set off in search of a substantive constitutional criminal law, two 
generations of criminal law scholars would follow his course. The 
101. Id. at 411. 
102. Id. at 404. 
103. See West Coast Hotel v. P�h, 300 U.S. 37 {1937) (repudiating the substantive due 
process approach associated with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 {1905)); see also NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 {1937) {abandoning the restrictive interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause). 
104. In Professor Seidman's words, the distributional questions in criminal law - who to 
blame and what to blame - produce a "struggle [that] is, in essence, political rather than 
moral." See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory 
and the Problem of Crime Contro� 94 YALE L.J. 315, 346 {1984). 
105. Some substantive constitutional limits do, however, exist. There are specific provi­
sions in the Constitution that effectively erect substantive limitations - the Fust Amend­
ment is one, see infra note 148, and the ban against ex post facto laws might be another, see 
supra note 63. Substantive principles of limitation also exist under the Eighth Amendment 
and. the Due .Process Clauses, but they will be identified through methodologies that are 
heavily imbued with process-based concerns. See infra section 11.A.4 {discussing the due 
process methodology of Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)); infra note 203 {discuss­
ing the proportionality principle as interpreted in Harme/in v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)), 
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highly regarded Herbert Packer of Stanford was among the first to 
follow, publishing a call to constitutional arms against strict liability 
in the 1962 Supreme Court Review that was slavishly modeled after 
Hart's argument.106 The Constitution had to embody a substantive 
theory of crime, Packer urged, because Hart was correct in his read­
ing of the Constitution's "unmistakable indications" and any read­
ing to the contrary would render the Constitution "anomalous."107 
The Supreme Court's precedent seemed to take just such a contrary 
reading, of course, but Packer insisted that the opinions deserved 
little respect because Hart's acid account of the Court's work also 
was correct.108 In point of fact, Packer later would claim, "[t]he 
forthrightness of this criticism of the Supreme Court manifests 
Henry Hart at his best."109 While mounting his argument for a con­
stitutionalization of mens rea, Packer revealed some tinges of what 
might be interpreted as contrition for his unabashed substantivism 
to the exclusion of process considerations.110 But he never let the 
106. See Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1. Professor Gerhard Mueller also was an early 
advocate of substantive constitutional criminal law. Writing at about the same time as Hart, 
Mueller's inspiration was Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), which he hailed as the 
decision that "unmistakably points the way in the right direction and will ultimately lead to a 
complete moral recovery of our penal law" - toward a ruling constitutionalizing the require­
ment of mens rea. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. 
RE.v. 1043, 1104 (1958). 
107. See Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 127. 
108. Packer discussed the precedent extensively, crediting Hart's analysis and showing 
only a little more sympathy toward the decisions than Hart. See id. at 110-22. According to 
Packer, Shevlin-Carpenter was "an example of constitutional adjudication at its worst." Id. at 
111. Balint engaged in an "obscure process of divination." Id. at 114. The discussion of 
mens rea in Dotterweich was nothing but an "offhand passage." Id. at 119. Morissette was an 
improvement, see id. at 119-21, but its "highly labored" opinion was too kind to Balint. Id. at 
121. Lambert was promising, but its "flabbiness" was regrettable. Id. at 133. All in all, 
Packer concluded, "the Supreme Court itself bears prime responsibility for having sanctioned 
the erosion of mens rea in what can be restrainedly described as an intellectually unsatisfying 
way." Id. at 151-52. 
109. Packer, Aims Revisited, supra note 1, at 490 n.2. 
110. Packer's first tinge of contrition came as he concluded his Hartesque emasculation 
of the strict liability precedent, when he suggested the possibility of "a more symp11thetic 
scrutiny of what the Supreme Court has done." Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 127. 
While a more sympathetic account might be drawn fairly easily, see supra text accompanying 
notes 90-105 (discussing Frankfurter's opinion in Dotterweich), Packer offered not even a 
sketch. 
Packer's second tinge of contrition came when he acknowledged that his endorsement of 
a negligence standard of criminal blameworthiness ran headlong into the quandary that 
Richard Wasserstrom had detailed a few years earlier: namely, that strict liability and negli­
gence are substantively near equivalents, and that any meaningful distinction between the 
two must be sought in process considerations relating to the comparative strengths and weak­
nesses of legislative and jury determinations of fault. See supra notes 51-52. Packer shook 
off the problem with a confident assertion that "[t]here are important and, for me, decisive 
differences between a legislative determination that certain conduct is unacceptable, made in 
advance of such conduct, and a jury's determination after the fact that a particular instance of 
such conduct fell below a previously established community standard." Packer, Mens Rea, 
supra note 1, at 144 (citing Wasserstrom in � footnote). Six years later, Packer developed his 
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possibility of an alternative process orientation take him off­
message. To the contrary, Packer eventually pursued an even more 
ambitious substantive theory of constitutional criminal law than had 
Hart and credited Hart for the inspiration. Following Hart's death 
in 1969, Packer authored a tribute in which he revisited Hart's "ep­
ochal essay" and suggested it was time to take the logical next step: 
a frontal substantive due process assault on "improvident uses of 
the criminal sanction" in the areas of abortion, pornography, gam­
bling, sexual behavior, and marijuana.111 If judges can heighten 
their scrutiny when First Amendment or equal protection values 
are concerned, then why not when the criminal sanction is 
implicated?112 
With Hart and Packer setting the example, and the Supreme 
Court showing apparent openness to a more aggressive constitu­
tional role in criminal law,113 a substantive-rights perspective on the 
response a bit more, arguing that the "decisive difference is that the legislature cannot and 
does not foresee the infinite variation of circumstance that may affect the jury's view of a 
particular case." PACKER, supra note 43, at 128. Even then, however, Packer did not explain 
why this difference is always decisive, even in situations where the legislature has foreseen 
and accounted for most of the "variation[s] of circumstance" that a jury likely would encoun­
ter and wishes to lay the law down there, the possibility of a few unforeseen "variation[s] of 
circumstance" notwithstanding. Nor did Packer offer any explanation as to why other con­
siderations - such as the legislature's superior representativeness, a jury's capacity for false 
acquittal, or the existence of discretionary institutional safeguards - cannot be regarded as 
"decisive" the other way. 
111. See Packer, Aims Revisited, supra note 1, at 490, 493. For the seminal work on the 
perils of overcriminalization, see Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. Poi_ & Soc. SCI. 157 {1967). See also John M. Junker, Criminalization 
and Criminogenesis, 19 UCLA L. REv. 697 {1972); Sanford H. Kadish, More on Over­
criminalization: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1972). 
112. See Packer, Aims Revisited, supra note 1, at 497-98. For support, Packer cited the 
touchstone of heightened scrutiny, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 {1938). While Justice Stone's footnote explicitly raised the possibility of heightened scru­
tiny when liberties associated with the Frrst Amendment are implicated or when legislation is 
directed against discrete and insular minorities, nothing in the footnote suggested a case for 
heightened scrutiny merely because the criminal sanction is involved. Packer was, shall we 
say, generalizing from the footnote. 
Process-based thinking in a "footnote four" vein does, however, have a bearing on the 
relationship between the Constitution and the criminal law. As we shall see, process­
reinforcement motivations inform the jurisprudence in this area. See infra section II.B. 
113. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 {1957), may have been enigmatic, but those at 
the time were right to take it as a signal that the newly reconstituted Warren Court might be 
open to new constitutional overtures in the criminal law. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 1, at 433-
35 (noting Lambert's potential more cautiously); Mueller, supra note 106, at 1104 (hailing 
Lambert and noting with enthusiasm its reformative potential); accord David C. Berg, Recent 
Decisions, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1008, 1008-11 (1958); Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 127-37; 
The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77, 183-85 (1958). Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962), underscored the potential for new substantive constitutional limits and, 
by the mid-1960s, the incorporation and privacy cases, see, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self­
incrimination as fundamental to due process); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
(incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
March 1998] Substantive Constitutional Criminal Law 1297 
relationship between the Constitution and criminal law took hold in 
academic circles. Hart's and Packer's dismissive interpretations of 
precedent predating the Warren Court, moreover, became some­
thing close to canonical truth.114 The upshot has been worthy schol­
arship, but scholarship long on substance and short on process.115 I 
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (finding a fundamental right to privacy), provided strong indications that the re­
strained due process understandings associated with Justices Frankfurter and Black, respec­
tively, were losing their hold. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), put a serious crimp in the 
expansionist trend in 1968, but new generative potential was about to be unleashed with 
respect to capital punishment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating 
unbridled discretion in capital-sentencing schemes under the Eighth Amendment). More­
over, a whole new vista of substantive possibilities was opened by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970), and the progeny it produced in the area of burdens of proof and presumptions. See 
infra notes 138, 140-47, and accompanying text. 
114. See, e.g., James J. Hippard, Sr., The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without 
Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1039, 1046-
48 (1973) (citing with approval Hart's and Packer's accounts of the precedent); John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Crimi­
nal Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1374-75 (1979) (citing with approval Packer's reading of the 
precedent); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Exam­
ination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U. L. REv. 775, 791 & n.112 (1975) 
(same). 
115. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substan­
tive Criminal Law - An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEXAS L. 
REv. 269 (1977) [hereinafter Allen, Limits of Legitimate Intervention] (arguing for a re­
strained interpretation of the reasonable doubt rule, analyzing the issue in terms of the ap­
propriate level of protection for individual liberty, and advocating Eighth Amendment 
proportionality review as the constitutional locus for that protection); Ronald J. Allen, The 
Restoration of In re Wmship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After 
Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1977) [hereinafter Allen, Restoration of 
Wmship] (same); Dripps, supra note 8 {arguing for an interpretation of the reasonable doubt 
rule that would constrain legislative freedom to define crimes and defenses and contending 
that the principle of legality underlies the reasonable doubt standard and that an individual 
right to be free from unauthorized punishment underlies the legality principle); Gary V. Du­
bin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 
18 STAN. L. REv. 322 (1966) (arguing for constitutionalization of the mens rea requirement); 
C. Peter Erlinder, Mens Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional 
Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law, 9 AM. J. CruM. L. 163 (1981) (same); Hippard, supra 
note 114, at 1051-57 (invoking natural law, the Ninth Amendment, penumbras, emanations 
from the Bill of Attainder Clauses, and due process as grounds to invalidate strict liability); 
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 114, at 1369-79 (arguing for "constitutional minima for crimi­
nal punishment" expressed through doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, and proportionality); 
Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Crim­
inal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1571 (1978) (arguing for constitutionalization of 
the mens rea requirement); Schwartz, supra note 66, at 157-60 (advocating strict scrutiny of 
the use of the criminal sanction); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 31-38 (arguing for constitutional­
ization of the mens rea requirement and a defense of desuetude); Sundby, supra note 8 ( argu­
ing that "ilµlocence" should be given a constitutional definition that indirectly constrains 
legislative choices in applying the criminal sanction and contending that "innocence" must be 
assessed by reference to society's values as expressed by the legislature but that those values 
should be generalized by the courts so as to undo the effects of legislative procedural com­
promises); Tushnet, supra note 114, at 799-802 (discussing constitutionalization of the mens 
rea requirement); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Crim­
inal Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 635, 648-51 (1966) [hereinafter Punishment Clause] (suggesting 
constitutionalization of the voluntary act requirement). 
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do not claim that scholars have wholly ignored process, for that 
clearly has not been the case. Many works have acknowledged the 
importance of legislative primacy and federalism to the Court's ju­
risprudence, but they have seen these considerations not as the 
foundations of a full-fledged process-theory alternative to substan­
tive theory, but merely as the ingredients of a fairly undifferentiated 
mass of resistance that those who seek to generalize substantive 
constitutional principles in order to limit the criminal sanction have 
the burden to overcome.116 More recent works have taken the next 
step by offering to explain why the rights-oriented substantive limi­
tations they espouse do not offend - or perhaps more accurately, 
do not offend very much - the Court's notions of legislative pri­
macy and federalism.117 One recent work from Professor William 
Stuntz has taken a significant further step, combining an appeal to 
process-reinforcement theory of the sort associated with footnote 
four of the Carotene Products case118 with an otherwise straigh�for­
ward plea for substantive constitutional criminal law in the tradition 
of Hart and Packer.119 These references to process considerations 
116. Professor Allen was among the first to stress the significance of legislative primacy 
and federalism in this area. See Allen, Limits of Legitimate Intervention, supra note 115, at 
300 (criticizing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 {1975), for failing to respect federalism and 
"the deference properly due a legislative enactment" and for imposing " 'the suffocating 
power of the federal judge' " upon state lawmakers (quoting Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 93 {1976) {White, J., concurring))). See also Jeffries & Stephan, supra 
note 114, at 1344-53 (offering similar criticisms). But see Saltzman, supra note 115, at 1620 
{defending the proposed constitutionalization of mens rea as bringing the Court only mini­
mally into matters generally reserved for the legislature). 
117. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 8, at 1705-12 {defending his proposed interpretation of 
the reasonable doubt rule as relatively respectful of political prerogatives); Hopkins, supra 
note 52, at 415-17 {defending the proposed constitutionalization of mens rea by linking it to 
the jury's structural role under the Sixth Amendment); Sundby, supra note 8, at 494-95, 499-
505 (defending a proposed constitutional interpretation of the reasonable doubt rule as 
designed to respect legislative moral judgments but not judgments on how morality and other 
concerns should be acco=odated, and thus sufficiently sensitive to federalism and separa­
tion-of-powers considerations). 
118. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 {1938) (suggesting 
the possibility of heightened judicial scrutiny to protect discrete and insular minorities). 
119. See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 21 (arguing that "if criminal suspects are indeed an 'out 
group' of the sort that needs special constitutional protection . . .  [that] protection should not 
stop with procedure"). 
Professor Stuntz's explicit attention to process considerations is welcome. His argument 
that mens rea should be constitutionalized and strict liability invalidated in the-name of pro· 
cess theory, however, leaves the impression that Stuntz takes process less seriously than have 
the Justices. Boiled down to its essence, Stuntz's argument runs as follows: (1) a constitu­
tionally problematic process failure that he terms "overcriminalization" can arise from broad 
delegation of discretion to prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and juries; {2) strict liability 
laws are examples of broad delegation because they contemplate that discretionary judg­
ments will tailor their application to the needs of justice in individual cases; {3) strict liability 
laws thus formally resemble the evil of "overcriminalization"; (4) strict liability's formal re· 
semblance to the evil of "overcriminalization" should be enough to condemn it as an occa• 
sion of process failure. See id. at 15-24, 31-34. The flaw in the argument is that it proves too 
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notwithstanding, the relevant scholarship from Hart's day forward 
has been uniformly touched by Hart's substantive spirit. The litera­
ture to date uniformly proceeds on the assumption that there is no 
meaningful relationship between the Constitution and criminal law 
- or at least none worth talking about - unless it is a relationship 
defined by substantive rights. Moreover, scholars uniformly have 
assumed that those substantive rights are to be found by generaliz­
ing from the Constitution's text, from Supreme Court precedent, 
and from the history of criminal law. Meanwhile, left largely unex­
plored are the process concerns that informed those disreputed pre­
Warren precedents like Dotterweich, despite their continued influ­
ence on the Court iri. the years since and, most importantly, their 
potential implications for the development of a constitutional juris­
prudence relating to substantive criminal law. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PROCESS: MODELING FROM 
.DOTTERWEICH 
Suppose we were to take those process concerns that 
culminated in Dotterweich seriously. Not that we should praise 
Dotterweich; Frankfurter's concessions to politics and discretionary 
governmental actors bespeak a narrower conception of the rule of 
law than some would care to endorse. But suppose we were to 
posit that the process thinking underlying Dotterweich reflects a 
strong center of constitutional gravity from which the Court's prac­
tice of constitutional law has been proceeding. What might that do 
to our understanding? 
One possibility is that it will bring a long and varied line of re­
lated constitutional decisions, currently dispersed across the frac­
tured law school curriculum, into a new and sharper focus and leave 
us with a better appreciation of the relationship between the Con-
much. Every delegation of discretion formally resembles the hypothesized evil of "over­
criminalization," yet it cannot be true that all discretion is unconstitutional because, as dis­
cussed above, the criminal law is chock full of rules that are drawn the way they are because 
discretion stands in the background as a check against "recalcitrant experiences." See supra 
notes 40-50, 95-97 and accompanying text. As I note in section II.B, infra, the constitutional 
trick is to separate the good delegations of discretion - those that do not evidence a failure 
of political or institutional safeguards from the bad delegations - those that do evidence a 
failure of political or institutional safeguards. I have no doubt that a strict liability statute 
might, depending on the circumstances, fall into either category. To presumptively invalidate 
strict liability across the board, however, is to assert a bright-line prophylactic rule that, to 
the Court's process way of thinking, cuts far too deeply into legitimate legislative practices. 
It exalts the fear of process failure in extreme cases over the day-to-day need for legislative 
flexibility in the fashioning of criminal sanctions - a move that the Supreme Court, believing 
in the efficacy of political and institutional safeguards, has resisted. See infra notes 172-78 
and accompanying text. 
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stitution and criminal law that the Court already has forged. I 
would not be the :first to suggest that there are affinities between 
cases like Lambert, Robinson, and Powell, the burden-of-proof and 
presumption cases, the vagueness decisions, and the Eighth 
Amendment proportionality and capital punishment cases.12° Our 
habit, however, has been to seize on the affinities that support a 
narrative in which substantive constitutional criminal law stars in 
the leading role - a story of its promise,121 its initial triumphs, sub­
sequently122 its frustrating rejections,123 and the emptiness that fol­
lowed.124 For true substantive believers, the cases also represent 
opportunities. They form a constitutionally relevant milieu, prece­
dent that contains credentialed expressions of value and theory 
from which the generalizer might generate substantive principles to 
limit the criminal sanction. Taking Dotterweich seriously, however, 
means looking for affinities that support a quite different process 
narrative - a story of a Constitution engaged in a considered and 
established relationship with the substance of criminal law, but a 
relationship founded on understandings of process. 
The process narrative lacks the exhilarating highs and epic tone 
of its substantive counterpart, which may explain something about 
their relative popularity. But if you believe, as I do, that constitu­
tional law is a practice that brings together an array of incommen-
120. For authorities that consider at least some of the connections between these cases, 
see supra note 115. 
121. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (suggesting that the reasonable 
doubt rule might merit a broad interpretation that would restrict legislative ability to define 
crimes and designate affirmative defenses); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (sug­
gesting constitutionalization of some form of the actus reus requirement); Lambert v. Cali· 
fornia, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (suggesting constitutionalization of some form of the mens rea 
requirement). 
122. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (invalidating, on the facts of the case, a 
life sentence without possibility of parole as unconstitutionally disproportionate); Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory death penalty law and es­
tablishing a requirement of individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances in capi­
tal cases); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating standardless discretionary 
sentencing schemes in capital cases and establishing a requirement that discretion be guided 
and channeled); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (invalidating an 
antivagrancy law on void-for-vagueness grounds). 
123. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (withdrawing from Mullaney v. 
Wilbur and upholding a broad legislative authority to define crimes and affirmative de­
fenses); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (limiting Robinson and upholding the constitu­
tionality of a law criminalizing public drunkenness). 
124. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (upholding state authority to 
render voluntary intoxication immaterial to criminal liability); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 
(1987) (upholding placement of the burden of proof on the defendant to establish self­
defense); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (permitting the state to employ ag­
gravating sentencing factors that trigger a mandatory higher sentence without adhering to the 
reasonable doubt rule). 
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surable interpretive arguments that need to be accommodated,125 
then it becomes clear that the process narrative has much to offer. 
Arguments from process do not alone account for the development 
of the relationship between the Constitution and criminal law, but 
there can be no doubt that they have been highly influential. 
What follows is by no means a definitive exposition, but merely 
a tentative sketch of the salient constitutional features that appear 
integral to any fully developed process rendition and that seem 
most important for those engaged in the practice of constitutional 
interpretation. 
A. Legislative Primacy 
We begin with the central and dominant theme of the process 
account: legislative primacy over criminal law choices. The point is 
so familiar that it is tempting simply to move on to other matters. 
Succumbing to the temptation, however, runs the risk that the fa­
miliar will turn into the banal. The notion of legislative primacy as 
developed in the cases in question is anything but banal. It reflects 
deeper understandings that should not be taken for granted. 
1. Criminal Law as Process 
The definitive modem articulation of legislative primacy over 
criminal law is found in an opinion handed down at the height of 
the Warren Court's liberal reign and authored by a Justice who will 
never be accused of kowtowing to the majority will. Thurgood 
Marshall wrote in Powell v. Texas: 
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection 
of interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common law has 
utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual for his anti­
social deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, 
justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a con­
stantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims 
of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and 
medical views of the nature of man. This process of-adjustment has 
always been thought to be the province of the States.126 
125. Professor Fallon's depiction of the practice is as good as it gets. See Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. 
REV. 1189, 1231-37 (1987). 
126. 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). Numerous ex­
pressions to similar effect may be found in the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michi­
gan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-1001 (1991} (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824-25 (1991}; McOeskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 
491 (1991); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987}; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 
85 (1986); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980). 
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Consider Marshall's words carefully, and it becomes clear that this 
is no rote invocation of judicial restraint, but rather the summoning 
of a vision of criminal law in America the significance of which 
would be hard to overemphasize. The criminal law that Marshall 
describes is not a static manifestation of moral theory or philoso­
phy. The doctrines that we associate with criminal law, as much as 
they help to outline a casebook, do not even define criminal law; 
rather, they are merely its "tools." For constitutional purposes, 
Marshall tells us, criminal law must be understood as something so­
ciety does. It is a "process of adjustment" in which society con­
fronts the "tension" between the "evolving aims" it wishes to 
pursue with the criminal sanction and "changing . . .  views" about 
the human existence, and the accommodations it reaches are "con­
stantly shifting." 
Characterizing criminal law as a process, rather than as some 
substantive corpus juris, bears significant implications for an analy­
sis of the Constitution's relationship with criminal law. The most 
important implication, however, is the most obvious one: as con­
ceived by Justice Marshall, criminal law collapses virtually by defi­
nition into politics, for it is through politics and the processes of 
representative democracy that society expresses its developing 
norms and negotiates the accommodation of new imperatives 
within existing moral and philosophical commitments. If criminal 
law truly is and shall remain a community practice, and a flexible 
and dynamic one at that, then the competent forum for that prac­
tice must be the legislature, not a constitutional court whose judg­
ments are manifestly less representative, ostensibly final and 
authoritative, and, thus, difficult to undo.127 
2. Federalism 
Justice Marshall felt no need to invoke precedent to support his 
conception of the criminal law as a process rather than a substance, 
though a cite to Dotterweich would have sufficed.128 Marshall did, 
127. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 {1971} ("[B)ecause of the serious­
ness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the co=unity, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activ· 
ity."); Powel� 392 U.S. at 547-48 {Black, J., concurring). The role of the courts in statutory 
interpretation and co=on law development is a different matter. Their effective perform· 
ance of those nonconstitutional functions is, as Hart correctly stressed, critical to the rea· 
soned elaboration of criminal law. See Hart, supra note 1, at 435. 
128. In his concurring opinion in Powell, Justice Hugo Black did cite Dotterweich, and for 
roughly the same point that Marshall was making: 
I feel there is much to be said for avoiding the use of criminal sanctions in many such 
situations [where a person is not morally blameworthy] . • . .  But the question here is 
one of constitutional law. The legislatures have always been allowed wide freedom to 
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however, turn to "essential considerations of federalism"129 to for­
tify his claim. 
Marshall summoned two basic points from the lore of American 
federalism. The first was the indisputable fact that criminal law 
choices traditionally have "always been thought to be the province 
of the States."130 The second and equally indisputable proposition 
was that the possibility of differing choices from state to state has 
been regarded as not only tolerable but positively advantageous. 
Justice Brandeis's famous metaphor was not mentioned by name,131 
but his image of states as laboratories was pl�y in Marshall's 
mind when he noted that federalism enables "fruitful experimenta­
tion" and "productive dialogue" in matters criminal, virtues that "a 
constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate."132 
As Marshall recognized, these two propositions of federalism 
militate against a constitutional judicial role in the realm of substan­
tive criminal law. But the significance of federalism to Marshall's 
argument runs even deeper. Brandeis's vision of federalism and 
Marshall's vision of criminal law as a process are mutually reinforc­
ing, each validating the other's constitutional appeal. On the one 
hand, a constitution with a federalism tradition that welcomes di­
versity in criminal law choices is naturally amenable to a conceptu­
alization of criminal law in the substantively agnostic terms of 
process and community practice. On the other hand, a constitution 
that recognizes criminal law as a complex process of constant read­
justment would be wise to seize the advantages of federalism and 
leave criminal law choices to the states. As Hugo Black stressed in 
a concurring opinion in Powell, joined by the Court's then-resident 
proponent of federalism, John Marshall Harlan, criminal law is 
determine the extent to which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of 
a crime. E.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). The criminal law is a 
social tool that is employed in seeking a wide variety of goals . . . .  
392 U.S. at 544-45 (Black, J., concurring). 
129. 392 U.S. at 535 (plurality opinion). 
130. 392 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion). 
131. Brandeis wrote: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial 
of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experi­
ment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our 
opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable . . . .  But in the exercise of 
this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal 
principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold. 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
132. Powel� 392 U.S. at 536-37 (plurality opinion). 
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most responsive to the people who require its protection and who 
must live under its force when it is fashioned and maintained at the 
state level.133 The benefit, moreover, redounds not only to the lo­
cals but to the nation as a whole. Federalism invites a decentralized 
disposition of issues that, if addressed at a national level, would 
spark peculiar divisiveness because of their myriad local implica­
tions.134 Moreover, as Brandeis observed when he extolled the 
blessings of state experimentation, "one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system" is that it ensures that the ill-advised experi­
ments we inevitably make will be confined to the particular labora­
tory "without risk to the rest of the country."135 
3. Imperfection 
The concept of legislative primacy spread deeper roots in the 
years after Powell, particularly in the wake of In re Winship, 136 
which held that due process "protects the accused against convic­
tion except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. "137 
The Court's affirmation in Winship of the constitutional stature 
of the reasonable doubt standard, followed by similar overtones in 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 138 opened new possibilities for constitutional 
limitations on the legislative definition of criminal law that com­
mentators and litigants have been happy to explore.139 Over the 
133. See 392 U.S. at 547 {Black, J., concurring) ("It is always time to say that this Nation 
is too large, too complex and composed of too great a diversity of peoples for any one of us 
to have the wisdom to establish the rules by which local Americans must govern their local 
affairs."). 
134. Throughout our country's growth, Justice Black observed, "the Nation [has] 
remembered that it could be more tranquil and orderly if it functioned on the principle that 
the local communities should control their own peculiarly local affairs under their own local 
rules." Powell, 392 U.S. at 547. It is our "ancient faith based on the premise that experience 
in making local laws by local people themselves is by far the safest guide for a nation like 
ours to follow." 392 U.S. at 548. 
135. See Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311. The Justices seemed mindful of this fact in Powell. 
Both Justice Marshall and Justice Black made note of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals's controversial experiments with the insanity defense during the 1950s and 1960s. 
See Powell, 392 U.S. at 536-37 {plurality opinion); 392 U.S. at 546 {Black, J., concurring). 
136. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
137. 397 U.S. at 364. 
138. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). As noted earlier, Mullaney held out promise that the reason­
able doubt rule might significantly limit legislative freedom to treat certain factors deemed 
relevant to crime and punishment as matters of affirmative defense. For a discussion of 
Mullaney and its subsequent limitation in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 {1977), see 
Allen, Limits of Legitimate Intervention, supra note 115; Allen, Restoration of Wmship, supra 
note 115. 
139. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 140-48; Allen, Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 
supra note 115; Allen, Restoration o/Wmship, supra note 115; Ronald J. Allen, Structuring 
Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary 
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years, the law has settled to the point that the basic constitutional 
rules can be stated succinctly. First, whether a particular factor 
should be relevant to the imposition of the criminal sanction is for 
the legislature to decide.140 Second, the legislature also is free to 
choose the legal form in which to cast a factor it has desired to 
make relevant to the imposition of the criminal sanction. The legis­
lature can designate the factor an "element" of the criminal offense, 
or the basis of an affirmative defense,141 or a criterion for consider­
ation at sentencing.142 Third, if the legislature decides to treat the 
factor as an "element," then the Constitution requires that the pros­
ecution bear the burden of proving the existence of the element 
beyond a reasonable doubt.143 Corollary rules require that legal 
presumptions cannot be employed in a way that effectively lessens 
that burden in application.144 Fourth, if the legislature decides to 
treat the factor as an affirmative defense or sentencing considera­
tion, the Constitution's reasonable doubt rule is not in effect.145 
The legislature is free to assign the burden of persuasion to either 
party,146 and may choose the degree of the burden.147 Frfth, the 
legislative freedom of choice referred to in the first, second, and 
fourth rules, while broad, is not entirely unfettered by the Constitu­
tion. Free-standing provisions such as the First Amendment and 
the Eighth Amendment must be observed, and the interests they 
encompass may impose substantive limitations on the criminal sanc­
tion in particular circumstances.148 Insofar as the Due Process 
Clauses are concerned, however, they afford precious little material 
Devices, 94 HAR.v. L. REv. 321 (1980); Dripps, supra note 8; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 
114; Sundby, supra note 8; Tushnet, supra note 114. 
140. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996); Patterson, 432 U.S. 197. 
141. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson, 432 U.S. 197. 
142. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
143. See, e.g., Patterson, 432 U.S. 197; Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684. 
144. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510 (1979); Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). See generally Allen, supra 
note 139, at 348-66 (discussing presumptions). 
145. See, e.g., Martin, 480 U.S. 228; Patterson, 432 U.S. 197. 
146. See, e.g., Martin, 480 U.S. 228 (involving a burden of persuasion on the defense); 
Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 (same); see also Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) 
(involving a burden on the prosecution). 
147. See, e.g., McMillan, 411 U.S. 79; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). But see 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (holding that the rudiments of due process that 
attach to criminal prosecution must be followed where the factor to be litigated may trigger 
an entirely different sentencing regime). 
148. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids criminalization of a mere status of drug addiction); Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (requiring mens rea as an element to safeguard Frrst Amendment 
interests). 
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for judges to assert in contravention of legislative judgments. The 
choices that face legislatures call for subtle balancing. As Justice 
White put it in the pivotal decision of Patterson v. New York, 
"[t]raditionally, due process has required that only the most basic 
procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of soci­
ety's interests against those of the accused have been left to the 
legislative branch."149 
We soon will return to the Court's culminating impressions of 
the Due Process Clauses.150 But first, it is instructive to explore the 
subtler ways in which legislative primacy became entrenched in the 
burden-of-proof cases, setting the stage for the Court's later impres­
sions of due process. The rules that emerged to solve Winship ques­
tions certainly are laden with judicial deference to legislative 
judgment, but it is the vision of criminal law underlying those rules 
that I wish to emphasize. Consistent with Justice Marshall's de­
scription in Powell, the Court continued to view criminal law as a 
"process of adjustment." But whereas Powell might appear to have 
kept its distance from that process and to have appraised it only in 
general terms, the burden-of-proof cases forced the Court closer to 
the gritty reality of what that process of adjustment actually entails. 
In Patterson, the Court came face to face with the imperfection of 
criminal law, and it accepted what it saw without so much as a 
blink. 
Patterson arose out of the New York legislature's decision to 
reformulate the heat-of-passion doctrine that traditionally has dif­
ferentiated murder from manslaughter, extending it to a wider 
range of cases in which a defendant has acted "under the influence 
of extreme emotional disturbance."151 The legislature also chose, 
however, to designate the "emotional disturbance" factor as an af­
firmative defense to the crime of murder, thereby assigning to de­
fendants the burden of establishing the factor by a preponderance 
of the evidence.152 What New York's lawmakers did, of course, was 
to respond to a fact of institutional life. The doctrinal tools of crim­
inal law cannot flawlessly operationalize the more abstract values 
149. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. 
150. See infra notes 173-201 and accompanying text. 
151. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198. 
152. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 199-200. In adopting the "emotional disturbance" formu­
lation, New York drew directly from the American Law lnstitute's treatment of manslaughter 
in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL ConE § 210.3(b) (1980). In shifting the burden 
to the defendant, however, New York departed from the Model Penal Code's position that 
the prosecution should bear the burden to prove the absence of emotional disturbance be­
yond a reasonable doubt when the issue is raised by the evidence. See MonEL PENAL Cons 
§ 1.12 (1985). 
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that guide them, but rather will err toward overinclusiveness, un­
derinclusiveness, or both. The New York legislators evidently ap­
preciated this, and they also understood that an integral part of the 
"process of adjustment" that makes criminal law what it is involves 
assigning the risk of error in an imperfect system. That task is per­
formed, consciously or unconsciously, whenever the doctrinal rules 
of decision are formulated.153 By manipulating the burden of 
proof, New York merely chose a more visible and less equivocal 
means of accomplishing the task. In allocating the burden of per­
suasion to defendants rather than the prosecution, New York 
sought to minimize the risk of erroneous acquittals of murder. The 
price was a greater risk of erroneous convictions of murder. 
Justice White, writing for the Court, upheld the power of a legis­
lature to make such choices in an opinion that is a thematic reprise 
of Frankfurter's opinion in Dotterweich. Like Frankfurter before 
him, White saw a criminal law that is a far cry from the comfortable, 
morally precise system that Henry Hart mythicized. White recog­
nized that criminal law is a conscious exercise in imperfection that 
is rife with potential hardships. As the rules are framed, choices are 
made that consign to certain defendants the risk of morally unjusti­
fied or excessive sanctions, and those choices may be made for insti­
tutional or administrative reasons just as readily as for moral 
ones.154 Like Frankfurter, White was not the least bit fazed by an 
imperfect criminal law, but accepted it as such and informed .the 
Court's constitutional understanding accordingly. As Frankfurter 
concluded in 1943, hardships were the unexceptional and unsenti­
mentalized results of a social process of "[b ]alancing relative hard­
ships,"155 and so they remained for White in 1977.156 
When this gloss of imperfection is added to the Court's constitu­
tional understanding of criminal law as a process of adjustment,157 a 
substantive constitutional criminal law theory in the fashion of 
153. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
154. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 209 ("To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does 
not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if 
in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate."). 
155. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943). 
156. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. For Justice White, this was nothing new. In his first 
Term on the Court, he filed a dissent in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 686 (1962) 
(White, J., dissenting}, that showed considerable appreciation for the wide range of factors -
there, venue considerations - that might explain a legislature's decision to frame its criminal 
law in morally imprecise terms. See also United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). 
157. Although in Patterson Justice White did not cite Justice Marshall's opinion in Powel� 
he cited other authorities to similar effect, including Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 
(1958); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 
(1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934}. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02. 
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Henry Hart becomes all the more difficult to maintain. Indeed, 
Justice White devoted the rest of his opinion in Patterson to demon­
strating why this is so. 
4. Rebuffing the Generalization of Principles 
A successful theory of substantive constitutional criminal law, 
we saw earlier, depends upon the ability to identify some principle 
that can generate doctrine. Henry Hart's principle of individual 
moral blameworthiness offers a fine example. Not just any cre­
atively articulated principle will do, however. To be vital in this 
connection, the principle requires a secure footing in some milieu 
that our practice of constitutional law recognizes as a legitimate 
source of content, such as text, history and tradition, or precedent. 
The principle need not locate itself firmly in every milieu, but it is 
highly preferable, if not essential, that the principle not be roundly 
refuted by any one of them.1 58 That is why Hart set about charac­
terizing criminal law's history and tradition in such a way that it 
would sustain the principle he purported to extract from it.1 59 It is 
why Hart massaged the Constitution's text to render it suggestive 
of, or at least not inhospitable toward, the principle he espoused.160 
It is also why Hart blistered Supreme Court precedent that could 
not be reconciled with his principle.161 
The art of generalization becomes exceedingly difficult to prac­
tice in Patterson's constitutional world - which, I think it is safe to 
say, was precisely the intention of the decision. Criminal law as 
described in Patterson's rugged and unholy terms is a social process 
of adjustment, constantly shifting, founded on perpetual tension be­
tween multiple and ever-evolving incommensurables, unpretentious 
about the efficacy of its rules of law, and candid and coldly calculat­
ing about their overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. The re­
sult is a constitutional milieu of history and tradition that will be 
stubborn to admit many enduring fundamental continuities of its 
own, or to make room for any that the generalizer might derive 
elsewhere. The entrenched legislative primacy that Patterson yields 
is not wholly immune from the generalizer's efforts to discern fun-
158. See generally Fallon, supra note 125, at 1240-48 (discussing the need for various 
forms of constitutional argument from text, historical intent, precedent, theory, and values to 
reach "coherence"). 
159. See supra section I.B.1. 
160. See supra section I.B.2. 
161. See supra section I.B.3. 
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damental principles in the patterns and practices that time helps 
reveal, but it is consciously resistant to them. 
Consider Justice White's treatment of the argument that New 
York's burden-shift in Patterson offended the principle underlying 
the reasonable doubt rule - in Justice Harlan's words, the "funda­
mental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."162 In the 
hands of an artful generalizer, that friendly aphorism can go far to 
impugn the various criminal law choices that assign risks of moral 
error to defendants. Henry Hart, you may remember, tossed it into 
his case against strict liability,163 and the dissenters in Patterson put 
it to similar use in attacking the burden-of-proof assignment.164 
White made short work of it. The aphorism could not be taken 
seriously as a principle from which judges could generate constitu­
tional doctrine, White concluded, because the imperfect criminal 
law has not taken the aphorism all that seriously itself. "While it is 
clear that our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial bur­
den in order to protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the risk 
it must bear is not without limits; and Mr. Justice Harlan's aphorism 
provides little guidance for determining what those limits are."165 
Criminal law, it seems, must be forgiven its slogans. 
If a proposition so central to criminal law's public legitimation 
strategy can be constitutionally disarmed that easily, one can imag­
ine the fate of less ingrained principles. Justice White's opinion in 
Patterson offers two representative examples. The first example in­
volved an effort to constitutionally ensconce a principle by deriving 
it from fresh precedent. Petitioner and dissenters alike argued that 
Mullaney v. Wilbur,166 decided just two years earlier, should be read 
to stand for the principle that 
the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or the sever­
ity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the 
presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden 
of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.167 
Th.is was not a strained reading. Justice White conceded that 
Mullaney contained language supportive of this view. But he de­
cided that the proposed principle would impose a limitation on leg-
162. In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
163. See supra note 40 and accompanying text 
164. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 223-24 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
165. 432 U.S. at 208. 
166. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
167. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214. 
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islative freedom : antithetical to the understanding the Court now 
asserted as historical and traditional wisdom.168 What then of 
Mullaney, and the principle of stare decisis? White was discrete 
enough to refrain from airing the Court's laundry, but the implica­
tion of his opinion is clear. Some of the Justices were asleep at the 
switch in Mullaney, acquiescing in an opinion from Justice Powell 
that reflected a soft spot for substantive constitutional criminal law 
theory that he would continue to demonstrate throughout his ca­
reer, 169 but that a majority, upon more careful consideration, could 
not abide. "The Court did not intend Mullaney to have such far­
reaching effect,"170 White concluded, and so the decision was recon­
stituted in Patterson.111 
The second example in Patterson involved an effort to advance 
the principle just stripped from Mullaney n9t for its precedential 
stature, but for its utility as a neutral principle in the service of 
sound constitutional interpretation. The starting point for that ef­
fort was Justice White's concession that legislative primacy a la 
Patterson might conjure a parade of horribles the likes of which ear­
lier dicta had balked at and which the majority in Patterson would 
be unwilling to endure.172 Justice Powell seized upon the conces­
sion in his dissent: 
The Court . . . concedes that legislative abuses may occur and that 
they must be curbed by the judicial branch. But if the State is careful 
to conform to the drafting ,formulas articulated today, the constitu­
tional limits are anything but "obvious." This decision simply leaves 
us without a conceptual framework for distinguishing abuses from le­
gitimate legislative adjustments of the burden of persuasion in crimi­
nal cases.173 
168. See 432 U.S. at 214 n.15. 
169. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing 
for a limitation on burden-shifting under Patterson); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-
98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court that no fundamental right exists to 
engage in homosexual sodomy, but suggesting that a prison sentence for such conduct would 
violate the Eighth Amendment); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (proposing that mitigating circumstances, within the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment, are only "those factors that are central to the fundamental justice of 
execution" and that it is for the Court to make that determination). Powell was eclectic in 
these matters, however. For example, it was he who wrote the definitive process-based de­
fense of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987). 
170. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215 n.15. 
171. See 432 U.S. at 215-16. 
172. See 432 U.S. at 210. For further discussion of the concession, see infra notes 177, 
187-88, 235-36 and accompanying text. 
173. 432 U.S. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was not the first to ask for 
some conceptual framework that would explain what made the legislative abuses posited by 
the majority unconstitutional. See Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, 
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Powell formulated a principle of "punishment and stigma" to pro­
vide the necessary tonceptual framework that he found lacking in 
White's opinion.174 
The weakness in Powell's argument was his assllinption that 
only substance could produce a conceptual framework. White's 
opinion offered no framework by Powell's standards because the 
only conceptual framework Powell would recognize was one that, 
like his own, asserted a substantively conceived limitation on the 
legislative ability to assign risks of moral error as part of its pro­
scriptive agenda. "Winship [the seminal case constitutionalizing the 
reasonable doubt requirement] is concerned with substance," 
Powell insisted, quoting his own opinion in Mullaney for 
authority.175 
The fact that the majority had Just converted Powell's substan­
tive excursion in Mullaney into Pattersonian process terms is indica­
tive of the depth of the disagreement here. Justice White's opinion 
for the Court did in fact contain the makings of a conceptual frame­
work, but it happened to be a process-oriented framework. In the 
majority's view, shifting some risk of moral error to an individual 
defendant is an utterly unremarkable occurrence in the imperfect 
criminal law of process, a commonplace instance of tension adjust­
ment that standing alone commits no constitutional indignity. Fur­
thermore, as the New York legislation illustrated, the availability of 
such a tension-adjustment device promotes, and may be critical to, 
a state's capacity to experiment with reforms in the spirit of 
Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 19 YALE LJ. 165, 
188 (1969). 
174. 432 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell sought to make the principle more 
attractive for the Court by kneading some deference to history and tradition into its 
application: 
The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecutor bear the burden of persuasion 
beyond a reasonable doubt only if the factor at issue makes a substantial difference in 
punishment and stigma. The requirement of course applies a fortiori if the factor makes 
the difference between guilt and innocence. But a substantial difference in punishment 
alone is not enough. It also must be shown that in the Anglo-American legal tradition 
the factor in question historically has held that level of importance. 
432 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Given Powell's willingness to 
generalize history and tradition, one might legitimately wonder how much deference to ob­
jective sources he was really adding. New York's emotional-disturbance formulation surely 
descended from the common law heat-of-passion doctrine, but Powell was guilty of under­
statement when he suggested that the change offered "a somewhat broader opportunity for 
mitigation." 432 U.S. at 227 (Powell, J., dissenting). The change significantly broadened, and 
perhaps dramatically broadened, the opportunity for mitigation. Only by conflating the new 
standard with its lineal ancestor could Powell conclude that the historical prong of his test 
was satisfied. 
175. 432 U.S. at 227 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Mullaney v. Wtlbur, 421 U.S. 684, 
699 (1975)). ' 
1312 · Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1269 
Brandeis.176 Refusing to let the tail wag the dog, the majority 
founded its conceptual framework on these everyday process con­
siderations and not, as Powell would have them do, on the theoreti­
cal existence of constitutional limits in certain extreme cases. 
That is not to say that White and the majority disregarded the 
possibility of legislative failure. As noted above, they conceded 
that certain cases of abuse, as hypothesized by earlier Supreme 
Court dicta, would exceed their tolerance for legislative primacy: 
[Our] view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate bur­
dens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some ele­
ments of the crimes now defined in their statutes. But there are 
obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in 
this regard. "[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare 
an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." . . .  The legis­
lature cannot "validly command that the finding of an indictment, or 
mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a presump­
tion of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt."177 
Perhaps White could have elaborated on what makes the "obvious" 
limit so "obvious," but he was content to leave the discussion as he 
did precisely for reasons relating to process. 
Pivotal to White's thinking was the effectiveness of political 
safeguards. Legislative primacy undeniably carries a theoretical 
risk of abuse, yet our constitutional tradition has been comfortable 
with legislative primacy because political safeguards significantly 
minimize that risk.178 By any practical measure, White reasoned, 
the balance has been successful. Legislative chicanery of the sort 
176. See 432 U.S. at 211 n.13, 214 n.15. Professor Dripps has criticized this portion of 
Justice White's argument as revealing a naked substantive preference for reforms along the 
lines undertaken in New York, which the majority feared would be stifled by a ruling in 
Patterson's favor. See Dripps, supra note 8, at 1708-09. Dripps is correct to note that "(fjirst 
and fundamentally, judicial reaction to the wisdom of legislative choices has no legitimate 
place in constitutional interpretation," id. at 1708, but he misconstrues the Court's point. 
What was important for the majority was not that any particular choice be made, but that the 
judiciary move with extreme caution before it announces a rule - divined, it should be 
noted, from no clear text, but instead manufactured by judicial generalizing - that would 
impede a legislature's ability to adopt inventive solutions, whatever they might be. 
177. 432 U.S. at 210 (quoting McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 
(1916), and Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943), respectively). 
178. As White explained: 
Long before Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the long-accepted rule was 
that it was constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses were 
to be proved by the defendant. This did not lead to such abuses or to such widespread 
redefinition of crime and reduction of the prosecution's burden that a new constitutional 
rule was required. 
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211; see also 432 U.S. at 211 n.12 ("The applicability of the reasonable· 
doubt standard . . .  has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is 
charged in any given case; yet there has been no great rush by the States to shift the burden 
of disproving traditional elements of the criminal offenses to the accused."). 
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identified by White as beyond constitutional limits has been foreign 
to our experience. The traditional balance, moreover, appears to 
retain its vitality today. Dispiriting as the contemporary climate 
might be to some of us, there is little to suggest that political safe­
guards have lost an effectiveness that they earlier had or that the 
probability of legislative abuse has changed for the worse. Nor is 
there reason to think that the value of legislative freedom and the 
need for legislative flexibility in defining penal laws have waned. 
For White and the Patterson majority, the traditional balance thus 
reflected a satisfactory constitutional equilibrium that any judicial 
interpretation of due process had to respect. To be sure, alternative 
due process methodologies could be advanced to provide a substan­
tive judicial safeguard against the troublesome hypothetical of legis­
lative abuse. They might include Justice Powell's constructive 
generalization of the "punishment and stigma" principle in 
Mullaney179 and Patterson,180 or a variant on that theme offered by 
Justice Stevens a decade later in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,1s1 or a 
judicial balancing of interests and hardships as intimated by Justice 
Brennan in Speiser v. Randall, 182 or the explicit balancing approach 
of Mathews v. Eldridge.183 But for Justices who view criminal law 
choices in process terms, such alternative approaches share two sig­
nificant shortcomings. , First, they are potentially over broad in their 
application, capable of invalidating even the most historically ac­
cepted legislative balance of hardships, thus threatening the consti-
179. 421 U.S. at 698-702. 
180. 432 U.S. at 226-27 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 242-
43 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
)81. 4i1 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that "any component of 
the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a special stigma and a special punishment" 
must be subject to the reasonable doubt standard); see also 477 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (agreeing with the core of Stevens's position). 
Justice Stevens worked to defend the apparent inconsistency between his acquiescence in 
Patterson, in which he joined the majority, and his dissent in McMillan, resorting to an unusu­
ally candid discussion of the operation of political safeguards to explain his views. Political 
safeguards could be trusted, he argued, to guard against the extreme abuse that Justice White 
posited as unconstitutional in Patterson - namely, the deliberate gross underdefinition of an 
offense by omission of elements, coupled with the creation of an affirmative defense that 
would require the defendant to prove innocence or mitigation. "No democratically elected 
legislature would enact such a law," maintained Stevens, "and if it did, a broad-based coali­
tion . . .  would soon see the legislation repealed." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 101 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). But Stevens suspected that the political process might be much more tempted to 
do something like it did in McMillan - define the crime in a politically uncontroversial 
manner, but then subject a subset of the group captured by that definition to "further pi.µrlsh­
ment for aggravating conduct not proved beyond a reasonable doubt" 477 U.S. at 102 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For this more probable scenario, Stevens argued, a judicial check 
was necessary. See 477 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting). · 
182. 357 U.S. 513, 524-26 (1958). 
183. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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tutional logic of legislative primacy itself. Second, they are 
subjective to a countermajoritarian fault, presupposing a judicial 
power under the Due Process Clauses to override an otherwise his­
torically accepted balance of hardships either because that balance 
conflicts with a judicially created neutral principle184 or because it 
deviates from a judicial sense of the equitable balance under the 
circumstances presented.18s 
So we return, as promised, to Patterson's culminating impres­
sions of the Due Process Clauses, equipped now to see that these 
impressions culminate in ways that reach well beyond the four cor­
ners of the Patterson opinion. For Justice White and the majority, 
Patterson was more than a case about elements, affirmative de­
fenses, and the burden of proof. It was, and was meant to be, a 
methodologically defining moment. From the days when Henry 
Hart authored The Aims of the Criminal Law, through the 1960s, 
right up to the Mullaney decision in 1975, inventive approaches per­
sistently sought to engage the judiciary in the making of a substan­
tive constitutional criminal law. Patterson was not the first decision 
to resist them. Almost a decade earlier, for example, Powell v. 
Texas rejected one such overture from Justice Fortas.186 But in 
Patterson the Court deliberately attempted to undermine them all, 
in one fell swoop, as methodologically illegitimate. Basic criminal 
law choices, the Patterson majority declared, required a due process 
methodology considerably narrower and less subjective than the in­
ventive substantive alternatives. Accordingly, the Court advanced 
a methodology true to process premises, one that relates to criminal 
law as an ongoing process of tension adjustment, dependent on po­
litically determined and imperfect accommodations rather than 
substantively theorized perfect answers. The majority in Patterson 
did not need to invent a new due process methodology to fit these 
specifications. It needed only to reassert an old one that looked to 
184. Justice Powell's approach in Mullaney and Patterson fits this description, as does 
Justice Stevens's approach in McMillan. 
185. The approaches suggested in Speiser and Eldridge fit this description. 
186. See 392 U.S. 514, 567 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Joined by Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, and Stewart, the Fortas dissent is an excellent example of how to generalize an 
expanded constitutional principle by appealing to popular values and then laying claim to 
precedent which might be read to support the principle. Consider Fortas's reading of 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962): 
Robinson stands upon a principle which, despite its subtlety, must be simply stated 
and respectfully applied because it is the foundation of individual liberty and the comer­
. stone of the relations between a civilized state and its citizens: Criminal penalties may 
not b� inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change. 
Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
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have lost some of its grip during the Warren years. As Justice 
White explained: 
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is 
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Govern­
ment . . .  and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so 
as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual 
States. Among other things, it is normally '�within the power of the 
State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, in­
cluding the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persua­
sion," and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription 
under the Due Process Clause unless "it offends some principle of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental."187 
Justice White's reassertion of that familiar due process test was the 
culmination of a process-oriented conceptual framework, and de­
scribed the means of invalidating legislative abuse should it ever 
occur. Judicial intervention in the name of a substantive fundamen­
tal principle could wait until political safeguards failed and a genu­
ine need for intervention arose. In that unlikely event, an abridged 
due process principle would reveal itself not in a shocked judicial 
conscience or in the logical elaborations of the judicial mind, but in 
process-validated expressions of social consensus. Thus, under 
Patterson, it takes a profoundly deviant legislative judgiil.ent to of­
fend due process. The rarity of such a judgment will afford the 
means for identifying and constitutionally condemning it.188 
187. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (citing Irvine v. California, 347 
U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion), and quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 
(1958), Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952), and Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105 (1934)). 
188. The due process standard that now customarily is referred to as the Patterson test 
does not eliminate judicial subjectivity altogether. When Justices look to history, tradition, 
and social consensus, they may well differ in their levels of abstraction and in their translation 
of what they see into legal principles due to varying degrees of generality. Patterson's aim is 
to limit that kind of subjectivity by channeling judicial inquiry away from criminal law's 
broad aphorisms and toward specific problems in specific contexts. To judge from the 
Court's practice under Patterson, the test has succeeded in reducing the level of abstraction. 
Compare Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 (leaving legislatures broad authority to assign burdens of 
proot) with Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (upholding the placement of the bur­
den on the defendant to establish incompetency to stand trial by a preponderance of the 
evidence) and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1377 (1996) (distinguishing Medina and 
holding that placing the burden on the defendant to establish incompetency to stand trial by 
clear and convincing evidence shifts more risk of error to the defendant than history and 
tradition have permitted). 
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Some legal minds trained on expansive Warren Court opinions 
like Katz1B9 and Miranda19° and law review articles like those of 
Henry Hart and Herbert Packer have a tendency to ignore the sig­
nificance of Patterson's reassertion of the history-bound, consensus­
weighted formulation of due process. Such minds regard it, I sus­
pect, as little more than one of those perfunctory reiterations of the 
hackneyed post-Lochner, judicial self-restraint theme that pop up 
from time to time.191 That reading trivializes Patterson by genera­
lizing it to the neglect of some important details. Patterson did not 
invoke judicial self-restraint generally; it endorsed its particular ap­
propriateness with respect to legislative primacy in criminal law 
choices. Patterson was not a post-Warren Court backlash that 
aimed to repudiate the generalizer's methodology in all constitu­
tional contexts; rather, it repudiated the particular use of that meth­
odology under the open-ended Due Process Clauses as a means for 
regulating criminal law choices. 
This last point of differentiation is a critical one. It is one thing 
for the Court to employ the generalizer's craft to ensure that textu­
ally specific constitutional protections like the privilege against self­
incrimination and the freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures enjoy a contemporary meaning that is fair to their spirit. 
This was Katz, Miranda, and, indeed, a large part of the constitu­
tional criminal procedure arising from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Amendments. Extending those modernized guarantees to 
the states through the selective-incorporation doctrine was no mi­
nor feat of expansion, but the leap in generalizing was constrained 
in some important respects. The textual anchors of the Bill of 
Rights remained close at hand, and, depending on whom you ask, 
their incorporation as fundamental to due process was either a 
faithful interpretation of the original understanding of the Four­
teenth Amendment192 or a modest, or at least tolerable, incremen­
tal step beyond what Supreme Court precedent already had 
recognized as fundamental to ordered liberty, as historically under-
189. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (liberalizing Fourth Amendment law by 
defining "search" as an intrusion upon a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest). 
190. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing a warnings requirement and 
right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment as a prophylactic protection for the privilege 
against self-incrimination in custodial interrogation settings). 
191. Some scholars, however, were quick to recognize the methodological significance of 
Patterson. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 550-52; Allen, Restoration of Wmship, supra 
note 115, at 36-39. 
192. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable 
to the states). 
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stood.193 Nor were the federalism concerns associated with the 
Fourteenth Amendment forgotten in this process of expansion; they 
have been worked back into the interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
provisions themselves in a sort of reverse incorporation.194 Fmally, 
and significantly, the lion's share of this expansion has been consis­
tent with, and in fact promoted, process-oriented constitutional 
ends, a fact that some scholars have noted.195 Much of twentieth­
century constitutional criminal procedure has been an exercise in 
reinforcing Dotterweich's model of the relationship between the 
Constitution and criminal law by shoring up the institutional discre­
tion mechanisms upon which the model depends. Such improve­
ments include bringing needed institutional respectability and 
professionalism to the law enforcement machinery that produces 
criminal prosecutions,196 lending a semblance of representativeness 
to the juries that pass on them,197 and affording suspects and de­
fendants access to basic legal resources should they not be able to 
afford them.198 
·While the Court's generalization of textually specific constitu­
tional protections is in many ways defensible, the generalization of 
the Due Process Clauses into a substantive constitutional criminal 
law is a different matter entirely. Unhitched from text and its con­
text, such an approach assumes increasing levels of abstraction and 
193. See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1643, 1643 n.3 
(1993) (discussing the incremental nature of the incorporation cases); Herbert L. Packer, The 
Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & PoucE SCI. 238, 239-40 
(1966) (discussing how the Court's constitutional criminal-process jurisprudence generally 
has grown incrementally}. 
194. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. LJ. 253, 
328-36-(1982) (discussing the role of federalism considerations in postincorporation Bill of 
Rights interpretations). 
195. See Jmrn HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95-98, 172-73 (1980) (discussing 
the process-theory implications of the criminal procedure provisions of the Constitution and 
of the Court's decisions interpreting them); see also Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resist­
ance to Political Process Theory, 11 VA. L. REv. 747, 763-68 (1991} (noting a political-process 
justification for 20th-century criminal procedure decisions); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 20-24 
(same). 
196. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (regulating custodial interroga­
tions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states in 
order to deter Fourth Amendment violations); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, The 
Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 810-15 
(1970) (discussing the capacity of courts to stimulate self-regulation of law enforcement). 
197. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding racially discriminatory 
peremptory challenges); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (incorporating a fair cross­
section requirement); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a 
jury trial}. 
198. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (providing the right to ap­
pointed counsel in postindictment eyewitness confrontations); Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (pro­
viding the right to appointed counsel in custodial interrogations); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (providing the right to appointed counsel in trials for all serious offenses). 
1318 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 96:1269 
invites perfectionist mythicizing of the relevant milieus, yielding 
countermajoritarian difficulties that modem substantive due pro­
cess jurisprudence has recognized in other contexts.199 With respect 
to criminal law, the approach fails to appreciate the fundamentally 
political and variable nature of substantive criminal law choices. It 
disrespects the process-based relationship between the Constitution 
and criminal law that Dotterweich stands for, defying process when 
it should be reinforcing process. In its heyday, the Warren Court 
perceived the difference in Powell.200 The Burger Court stressed it 
in Patterson. Today, the Rehnquist Court abides by it.201 
B. Process Reinforcement 
Legislative primacy is the central theme of a process account of 
the relationship between the Constitution and criminal law, and it 
199. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, CJ.) (arguing that constitutional resort to history and tradition for fun­
damental principles should "refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition 
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified") with 491 U.S. at 
132 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring) (critiquing Scalia's position as inconsis­
tent with precedent and insufficiently flexible) and 491 U.S. at 136-47, 156-57 (Brennan, J., 
joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing Scalia's position as a false palli· 
ative for judicial subjectivity and as an erroneous conflation of liberty interests and compet· 
ing governmental interests). 
200. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 550 (discussing 
Powell and equating it with Patterson). 
201. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (reaffirming the Patterson 
test as the standard for establishing due process requirements in matters of criminal law, 
rejecting the balancing methodology of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as too 
intrusive, and asserting that "because the States have considerable expertise in matters of 
criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradi­
tion, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to legislative judgments in this area"). 
1\vo interesting cases from the 1995 Term illustrate Patterson's vitality in the current 
Court See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2017, 2021 (1996) (plurality opinion by 
Scalia, J.) (applying the Patterson test and noting that it imposes a "heavy burden" on one 
who seeks to establish a due process violation and holding that a proposed principle requir­
ing jury consideration of voluntary intoxication when relevant to mens rea, though gaining 
acceptance, "is of too recent vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and perma­
nent allegiance to qualify as fundamental, especially since it displaces a lengthy common-law 
tradition which remains supported by valid justifications today"); 116 S. Ct. at 2025 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (applying Patterson and concluding that the state validly defined 
mens rea "to eliminate the exculpatory value of voluntary intoxication • . .  given the lengthy 
common-law tradition, and the adherence of a significant minority of the States to that posi­
tion today"); 116 S. Ct. at 2030-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing that, under Patterson, 
the state could specially define mens rea to exclude consideration of voluntary intoxication, 
but arguing that Montana failed to do so); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1377 (1996) 
(unanimously holding that while the state may place the burden of persuasion upon the de­
fendant to establish incompetency to stand trial, a standard of clear and convincing evidence 
places more risk of error upon the defendant than tradition has allowed, thereby violating 
due process under the Patterson test). 
For an illustration of the force of legislative primacy in efforts to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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neatly explains the decisions that have most resolutely rejected ap­
peals to substantive theorizing - Powell and Patterson most nota­
bly. But what are we to make of cases like Lambert and Robinson, 
or the due process vagueness decisions, or the Eighth Amendment 
forays into proportionality and capital punishment? 
These cases customarily are understood as substantive constitu­
tional criminal law's fleeting successes in the Supreme Court, the 
rare moments when the Justices have identified a substantive prin­
ciple of individual right that might limit legislative power to impose 
the criminal sanction. According to this narrative, Lambert and 
Robinson go down as one-hit wonders, for neither produced any 
principle that the Court has been willing to expand beyond the nar­
row factual confines of each case.202 Of comparably limited signifi­
cance is the Court's recognition of a proportionality principle under 
the Eighth Amendment which stands as a theoretical promise of a 
substantive judicially enforceable limit, but in its current formula­
tion is scarcely more enabling of judicial intervention than 
Patterson's tradition-, history-, and consensus-bound due process 
test.203 By contrast, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, insofar as it 
rests upon a fair-notice requirement, reflects a substantive principle 
of right that has achieved a stable constitutionalization over the 
years.204 Of even greater significance is the modem capital 
punishment jurisprudence that has developed since Furman v. 
202. As Professor Stuntz succinctly put it, "Lambert's progeny is almost nonexistent." 
Stuntz, supra note 11, at 5 n.11. Regarding Robinson, a student co=entator's forecast "that 
insofar as broad constitutional principles are concerned, it may be little more than a 'ticket, 
good for this day and train only,' " seems prescient in retrospect. See Punishment Clause, 
supra note" 115, at 650 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting)). 
203. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, repudiated the proportionality principle, see 501 U.S. at 974-75, 985-86 (opinion 
of Scalia, J.), but the center of the Court - Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter - held 
to the principle on stare decisis grounds, see 501 U.S. at 996-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ.) (adhering to the core 
principle of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), on stare decisis grounds). For Kennedy, 
O'Connor, and Souter, the proportionality principle is very narrow due to "the primacy of 
the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal sys­
tem, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors." 
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
204. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jackson­
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). See generally 1 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scarr, JR., SUBSTANITVE CruMINAL LAw 126-35 (1986) 
(discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, 
and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. RE.v. 189 (1985) (advocating a theory that 
integrates vagueness with the legality principle and principles of statutory interpretation in 
the criminal law). 
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Georgia, 205 with its requirements of an individualized mens rea de­
termination,206 consideration of mitigating factors,2°1 and enforce­
ment of proportionality limitations on the death penalty.2os The 
capital cases demonstrate just what judges can do when text, here 
the Eighth Amendment, allows them to generalize substantive prin­
ciples in a cordoned-off area of law, secure in the knowledge that 
neither the principles nor the methodology that creates them will 
spread to other areas so long as judges can say "death is 
different. "209 
It is eminently reasonable to read these lines of cases as identi­
fying substantive constitutional principles that limit legislative au­
thority. This does not mean, however, that the cases are not 
susceptible to a process-oriented reading as well, one that recog­
nizes that constitutional limitations on substantive legislative judg­
ments need not owe their existence to some underlying theory of 
substantive constitutional criminal law but in fact can exist to serve 
and strengthen process. Such a reading is possible, and it brings to 
the fore the second key theme in a process account of the relation­
ship between the Constitution and criminal law: the theme of pro­
cess reinforcement. 
To introduce the theme of · process reinforcement, recall 
Dotterweich's understanding of criminal law, the Constitution as an 
instrument of judicial review, and the relationship between the two. 
Then do what Henry Hart did not do. Concede that process is the 
starting point for constitutional analysis. Admit to the multiplicity 
of competing values and objectives that inform criminal law and to 
the appropriateness of characterizing criminal law as an ongoing 
process of tension adjustment that society itself must practice 
through its politics. Accept that moral imprecision is an inevitable 
incident of criminal law choices, and recognize the importance of 
political and institutional discretionary safeguards in checking and 
205. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
206. See TISon v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); see also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 
(1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
207. The progenitor of this requirement, Wooclmn v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), 
has spawned a long line of precedent. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Hitchcock v. 
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
208. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 
361 (1989); Penry, 492 U.S. 302; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
209. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (noting that "[o]ur cases 
creating and clarifying the 'individualized capital sentencing doctrine' have repeatedly sug­
gested that there is no comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of the 
qualitative difference between death and all other penalties"). 
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ameliorating that imprecision. Acknowledge that judicial skepti­
cism toward the generalization of substantive constitutional princi­
ples exists, and that it increases considerably when we move from a 
textually and contextually confined provision to the open fields of 
the Due Process Clauses. Respect legislative primacy and instead 
of treating it as a canard for knee-jerk judicial self-restraint, appre­
ciate that it is a considered judicial choice resting upon contestable, 
but all the same legitimate, considerations. · Take these premises as 
your starting point, if only for the sake of argument. Then ask what 
a conscientious Justice would do to ensure that this process-based 
relationship between the Constitution and criminal law retains its 
legitimacy. 
The specific strategies might vary, but two general approaches 
readily present themselves, each corresponding to an essential ele­
ment of the Dotterweich model. The first strategy would aim to 
promote the ideal of deliberate legislative choices, the kind of poli­
tics that the Dotterweich model presupposes,210 and refuse to dig­
nify the status quo when that brand of politics is conspicuously 
missing. The second strategy would seek to mind the political and 
institutional safeguards upon which the Dotterweich model depends 
and to consider corrective interventions when their effective opera­
tion is in serious question. 
The Supreme Court's recognition of certain constitutional limi­
tations on legislative decisionmaking in the criminal law area, I be­
lieve, reflects these strategies. I wish to stop short, however, of 
suggesting that a comprehensive theory informs the Court's 
process-reinforcement actions, or that those actions have been pur­
sued with any conscious sense of conformity to a given set of strate­
gies. If that marks a shortcoming in the Court's jurisprudence, 
think twice before blaming the Court. For more than half a century 
now, Justices have made no secret of their allegiance to the 
Dotterweich model, yet those of us blessed with the time to develop 
a sound theory of process reinforcement in this area - that is, 
criminal law academics, not busy Justices with a diverse docket -
have not done much to help. Substantive theorizing always will 
have a rightful and important place, but until process experiences 
an equivalent ascension in the criminal law academy - as opposed 
to the constitutional law academy, where process theory already has 
won notable adherents - the Justices should not be faulted if their 
210. For development of this point, see infra section II.B.1. 
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approach to process reinforcement falls short of reflecting a com­
prehensive theory. 
The theme of process reinforcement does not leap off the pages 
of the United States Reports in self-announcing legal doctrine, but 
its presence is plainly revealed in a distinct pattern within the 
Supreme Court's precedents. As we have seen, substantive perfec­
tionist generalizing and legislative primacy are forces that usually 
pull in opposite directions for the Court, and legislative primacy 
prevails in that tug-of-war unless the generalizing is well anchored 
to a particular textual guarantee211 or makes a convincing appeal to 
an enduring social consensus.212 Ih those particular and unusual 
cases, however, in which the Court seems to have given in to sub­
stantive constitutional criminal law penchants, often the forces are 
not nearly so opposed as one might expect. 'fypically, and perhaps 
invariably - though I reserve judgment on quite so sweeping a 
claim - these cases involve some serious fissure in the foundation 
of Dotterweich's model: either an absence of deliberative legislative 
choice or some dysfunction in the operation of political and 
discretionary institutional safeguards. As those :fissures deepen, the 
picture of process that materializes is so alien to Dotterweich's 
premises that the process-minded Justice can no longer counte­
nance it in good conscience. With the substance-oriented and 
process-oriented forces now pointing in the same direction, a ma­
jority of the Court will come together to invalidate the status quo 
represented by the case. The written work produced by the Court 
to accompany that judgment, however, will inevitably show signs of 
instability that underscore the fact that a delicate accommodation 
has been struck between forces usually locked in opposition. The 
Court might assert a principle whose rationale depends on an un­
certain blend of substance and process. The void-for-vagueness 
opinions are a good example, resting on a substantive concern for 
fair warning as well as a process concern about arbitrary and dis­
criminatory enforcement.213 Or the Court might opt for a muddied 
mix of case-specific points and qualifications that dispose of the 
particular problem at hand, but ensure the Court's ability to distin­
guish the case in the future. The inscrutable Lambert provides a 
classic illustration. Sometimes the Court, unable to translate its ac­
commodation between substance and process into an agreeable for-
211. See supra notes 189-93, 203, 205-09 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra notes 178-88, 203 and accompanying text. 
213. See LAFAVE & Scarr, supra note 204, at 126-35 (discussing the dual grounds under­
lying the vagueness doctrine). 
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mulation, fractures itself into a cacophony of separately expressed 
views that announce only terms for further debate. The ground­
breaking capital cases - Furman v. Georgia, 214 Gregg v. Geor­
gia, 215 and Woodson v. North Carolina216 - are prototypical. 
Sometimes a deceptively tranquil opinion is handed down, but in­
stability soon reveals itself when the Court confronts the opinion in 
a new light and pointedly reconstitutes its meaning. · Robinson, 
which yielded to Powell, exemplifies the phenomenon. 
Some may find such instability disturbing. Given the current 
state of constitutional practice, I, for one, do not. If the relationship 
between the Constitution and criminal law is to be defined in 
Dotterweich's process terms, it will be a healthier, more stable, and 
more mature relationship in the long run if the Court maintains 
some sensitivity to the serious process dysfunctions that occasion­
ally do surface in the real world. The short-term consequences of 
that sensitivity may be instability as the Justices feel their way to­
ward a theory of process reinforcement, but even the best relation­
ships experience growing pains. 
So what exactly are these process flaws that have drawn the 
Court's attention, and how have they stimulated process reinforce­
ment and set off this pattern of instability in the Court>s opinions? 
As I have suggested, there are two general types: absences of delib­
erative legislative choices and dysfunction in the operation of polit­
ical and discretionary institutional safeguards. In many of the cases 
that we customarily identify as instances of substantive constitu­
tional criminal law, at least one of these flaws - and almost always 
both, as the presence of one is likely to cause the existence of an­
other - seems to have influenced the decision. The cases thus may 
be identified as episodes in process reinforcement as well. 
1. The Absence of Deliberative Legislative Choices 
The concept of legislative primacy derived from Dotterweich 
and its lineal relations, we have seen, presupposes reasoned crimi­
nal law choices, consciously made by a political process that in fact 
"[b]alanc[es] relative hardships."217 The concept contemplates pur­
poseful policy decisions that are reached with an awareness and ac.,. 
ceptance of the "possible injustice[ s r associated with them.218 It 
214. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
215. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
216. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
217. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943). 
218. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922). · 
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may not go so far as to demand the classical republican exercise of 
pure civic virtue, but neither does it resign itself to a no-holds­
barred pluralistic interest-group affair that merely reflects the equi­
librium of private political power. The expectation throughout the 
Court's decisions has been that legislators will act with some auton­
omy, will apply their judgment, and will deliberate to produce crim­
inal laws that reflect the moral sense of the community.219 The 
constitutional literature frequently assigns the term "deliberative 
legislation" to that kind of politics,220 and we may appropriate it 
here. 
If deliberative legislation undergirds Dotterweich's process 
model, then its absence presents an occasion for process reinforce­
ment. It does not follow, however, that the Court should or does 
219. Consider in this regard Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), and the Court's 
concern that it avoid an interpretation of the constitutional reasonable doubt rule that would 
limit legislative flexibility to reassign risks of moral error - a flexibility that the Court 
thought necessary "to enhance the potential for liberal legislative reforms." 432 U.S. at 209 
n.11. As Professor Dripps has correctly pointed out, "[t]he Court's rule thus has the virtue of 
permitting deliberate legislative compromises that balance substantive expansion of exculpa­
tory conditions against procedural concessions to the prosecution." Dripps, supra note 8, at 
1677. 
Dripps goes on to argue, however, that the Court was mistaken to think that its deferen­
tial stance was necessary to preserve legislative flexibility to compromise. A broader reason­
able doubt rule, he argues, need not foreclose legislative compromises. All that politicians 
have to do is look more widely for their compromises: 
Criminal law recodifications involve a host of issues, each of which invites a defense 
position and a prosecution position . . . .  If burden-shifting were off-limits, the legisla­
ture's law-and-order faction might be convinced to accept a new affirmative defense if 
offered another concession, such as a restriction of some other substantive defense that 
has outlived its usefulness . 
. . . If criminal law reform is an auction among legislative factions, the balance of 
forces in the legislature cannot be changed by judicial decision. 
Id. at 1710-11 {footnotes omitted). 
Dripps's invocation of pluralism in his critique of Patterson is intriguing, yet it also unin­
tentionally demonstrates just how alien that vision of pluralism is to the Court's constitu­
tional mindset in Patterson. The kind of logrolling that Dripps envisions - "I'll give you 
your broadened provocation defense if you agree to support my bill to abolish the insanity 
defense" - is not unthinkable. But it is no way to formulate a criminal law the individual 
doctrines of which reflect the considered moral judgment of the co=unity on the particular 
points that each of those doctrines addresses. It misses the profound distinction between 
compromises that fine tune a policy by allocating the risks of error - something Patterson 
sought to preserve for the legislature - and cross-issue horsetrading that abandons even the 
pretense of a reasoned elaboration of policy on each of the issues involved. If the politics of 
criminal law should not "mask substantive policy choices" from full public view, Patterson, 
432 U.S. at 229 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting), the pluralism that Dripps hypothesizes would 
seem a nightmare of obfuscation. If I vote for your broadened provocation defense because 
you vote for my bill to abolish the insanity defense, what are the "substantive policy choices" 
that we have made? 
220. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 
65 TEXAS L. REv. 873, 875-76 (1987) (describing deliberative legislation, contrasting it with 
pluralism, and noting that both visions have figured in the Supreme Court's constitutional 
jurisprudence). See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND Dis. 
AGREEMENT (1996) {exploring deliberative democracy). 
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demand proof of deliberative legislation from every criminal law 
that is challenged under the Constitution. A broad judicial commis­
sion to stand in judgment of the deliberativeness of politics would 
be both unrealistic and dangerous. We are dealing here with an 
aspiration whose contours are uncertain, and we are dealing with 
human beings whose claims to identify it can and will be infected by 
their personal substantive preferences. Most of the time, then, the 
Court has little choice but to presume that deliberative legislation 
lies behind a criminal law, that the assignment of hardships has 
been conscious, and that any resulting moral imprecision has been 
left to discretionary institutional safeguards to ameliorate as "recal­
citrant experiences"221 on the facts of the particular case. 
Yet that presumption need not be irrebuttable and conclusive in 
all cases. Extreme situations do present themselves, situations 
where the qualities of deliberative legislation seem so markedly ab­
sent as to open serious :fissures in Dotterweich's foundation that, 
given their extremity, permit a discrete departure from the pre­
sumption, although one that is careful not to swallow the rule. The 
void-for-vagueness cases are instructive. There is no mystery to 
vague statutes. They fail to provide fair notice and invite arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement because basic choices were not 
made at the legislative level.222 When the Court invalidates a vague 
law, it in essence remands the statute to the legislature for further 
deliberation and the making of those basic choices, thereby restor­
ing credibility to the Dotterweich model and its tenet of legislative 
primacy. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Furman invalidating "unbri­
dled discretion" in capital sentencing schemes arose from similar 
circumstances and performed a similar remanding function as the 
void-for-vagueness cases. The absence of meaningful legislative 
standards to guide the imposition of the death penalty had been a 
centerpiece claim of the litigation campaign against capital punish­
ment mounted during the 1960s. The absence of such standards, 
much like a vague criminal law, belied a failure of deliberative legis-
221. See supra note 97. 
222. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.7 (1983) (" 'It would certainly be 
dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and 
leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should 
be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department 
of government.' " (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876) (emphasis ad­
ded))); see also Jeffries, supra note 204, at 189 (noting that the doctrine "forbids wholesale 
legislative delegation of lawmaking authority to the courts"). 
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lation.223 Given the widespread ac·ceptance of unbridled sentencing 
discretion and its history as a salutary innovation for defendants, 
the claim required a feat of generalizing which the Court was un­
willing to perform under the Due Process Clause.224 But when the 
claim was raised just one year later in Furman, this time under the 
auspices of the Eighth Amendment's more discrete and therefore 
paradoxically more enabling Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause, it prevailed.225 Politics, the Court concluded, would have to 
move capital punishment out of the shadows of discretion and ex­
press some meaningful choices about its application.226 
Furman and the vagueness cases demonstrate both the Court's 
sensitivity to extreme situations where politics seems largely to 
have abdicated and the Court's ability to frame a response that is 
calculated to stimulate political responsibility.227 Subtler deviations 
223. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971) (summarizing the peti­
tioners' challenge as a claim that "to leave the jury completely at large to impose or withhold 
the death penalty as it sees fit is fundamentally lawless"). 
224. See 402 U.S. 183 (rejecting a due process challenge). 
225. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); 408 U.S. 
at 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 
314 (White, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 363-69 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also ELY, supra 
note 195, at 173-77 (discussing Furman, noting its thematic relationship with the void­
for-vagueness doctrine, and emphasizing the representation breakdowns that they share); 
Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth Amendment, 
75 TExAs L. REv. 1301, 1332-33 (1997) (discussing how moratorium-era litigation caused the 
Court to doubt that the democratic processes were registering respectable determinations of 
the public interest with respect to capital punishment). 
226. Once the legislatures proceed to make choices and the Court proceeds to deal with 
its process-reinforcement ruling as a precedent, where constitutional law moves next is an­
other matter entirely. A decision handed down for process-reinforcement reasons, replete 
with the usual instability, see supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text, may slip quietly into 
the past See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). Alternatively, it might con­
verge with similar precedents and mature into a constitutional standard that directly reflects 
its substance and process lineage, such as the void-for-vagueness doctrine. As the post­
Furman expansion of capital punishment jurisprudence demonstrates, the initial process­
reinforcement decision also may assume a life of its own, serving as a rich milieu for the 
generalization of constitutional principles - some speaking the language of substantive right, 
others expressing a process perspective, and others accommodating the two - that, in turn, 
leads to the fashioning of rules and standards to implement those principles. See Bilionis & 
Rosen, supra note 225, at 1332-37 (discussing how process reinforcement was the impetus for 
Furman and how the Court thereafter searched for judicially manageable principles to imple­
ment the decision). 
227. For another and quite striking example of judicial refusal to validate the legislative 
status quo on the ground that it fails to reflect a product of deliberative legislative choice, see 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 848-59 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg­
ment). At issue there was the constitutionality of capital punishment as applied to juveniles 
under the age of 16. Justice O'Connor expressed her reticence to substitute the Court's "in· 
evitably subjective judgment . . .  for the judgments of the Nation's legislatures," 487 U.S. at 
854 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), yet she also found herself unable to credit 
general laws that operate to make such juveniles eligible for the death penalty as reflective of 
deliberative legislative choices. O'Connor thus reached an "unusual" resolution: Execution 
of such a juvenile might or might not be constitutional, but it cannot proceed under the 
Eighth Amendment in the absence of clear evidence that the legislature forthrightly con-
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from the ideal of deliberative legislation also might influence the 
Court to take process-reinforcement action. Such was the case 
when mandatory death penalty legislation enacted in response to 
Furman came before the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina228 
and Roberts v. Louisiana.229 At face value, the legislatures of North 
Carolina and Louisiana seemed to have made deliberate, though 
harsh, choices, but the Court saw these laws for what they really 
were: uniquely unreliable indications of society's views about the 
appropriate imposition of capital punishment that emanated from a 
politics badly warped by a failure to appreciate Furman's process­
reinforcement intentions. Before Furman shook up the political 
process, no one seriously would have maintained that a mandatory 
death penalty for a broadly defined class of murderers accurately 
reflected society's sense of the just balance of relative hardships. 
American legislatures uniformly had renounced such laws as dan­
gerously overinclusive, had instated unbridled sentencing discretion 
in their place, and had defended the change on the quite sensible 
ground that just choices between life and death require considera­
tion of nuances that no legislature is competent to fully foresee and 
formalize ex ante et pro forma.230 As the joint opinion of Justices 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Woodson concluded, "[i]t seems ev­
ident that the[se] post-Furman enactments reflect attempts by the 
States to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the Con­
stitution, rather than a renewed societal acceptance of mandatory 
death sentencing . . .  attributable to diverse readings of the Court's 
multi-opinioned decision in [Furman]. "231 By invalidating the 
mandatory laws, the Court re�ed and reinforced the need for 
legislative choices deliberative of society's moral sensibilities. 
2. Dysfunction in the Operation of the Political and Discretionary 
Institutional Safeguards 
The concept of legislative primacy drawn from Dotterweich and 
its lineal relations is also undergirded, we have seen, by a presuppo-
fronted the question and explicitly made the choice in favor of eligibility. See 487 U.S. at 
857-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The result thereby "allows the ultimate 
moral issue at stake in the constitutional question to be addressed in the first instance by 
those best suited to do so, the people's elected representatives." 487 U.S. at 858-59 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
228. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
229. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
230. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199-208 (1971); see also Woodson, 428 
U.S. at 290-93 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Powell and Stevens, JJ.). 
231. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 298-99 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Powell and 
Stevens, JJ.). 
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sition that political safeguards operate effectively to minimize the 
risk of excessively harsh applications of the criminal sanction -
what Henry Hart called a failure of the "legislature's sense of jus­
tice."232 Legislative primacy further presupposes that institutional 
discretionary mechanisms - chiefly prosecutorial discretion, jury 
discretion, and sentencing discretion, though the occasional grant of 
clemency should not be forgotten - will stand as meaningful safe­
guards against the "recalcitrant experiences" that overinclusive, 
morally imprecise laws can generate in particular cases. Just as the 
logic of process leads the Court to relax the rigors of legislative pri­
macy when deliberative legislative choices seem pointedly absent, 
so too will it elicit a process-reinforcement response from the Court 
when strong evidence suggests that these political and institutional 
safeguards are malfunctioning. 
A vast constitutional literature already has addressed the cor­
rective role of judicial review over dysfunctions in the safeguards of 
process, much of it owing to John Hart Ely's Democracy and Dis­
trust,233 so we may summarize here. The heart of the matter is arbi­
trary, capricious, or discriminatory treatment toward peculiarly 
powerless groups or, to harken to Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's 
fourth footnote in the Carolene Products case, "prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those . . . processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon."234 As political outsiders, such groups may lack the power, 
means, and opportunity to voice their interests at the legislative 
level. Even if "no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, repre­
sentatives beholden to an effective majority [may] systematically 
disadvantag[ e] some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced 
refusal to recognize commonalities of interest . . .  thereby denying 
that minority the protection afforded other groups by a representa­
tive system."235 At its naked worst, a failure of representational 
democracy along these lines produces criminal legislation that spe­
cifically targets members of a disadvantaged group. Such legisla­
tion resembles a bill of attainder,236 which, come to think of it, was 
232. See supra sections I.B.3 & II.A.4. 
233. ELY, supra note 195. 
234. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
235. ELY, supra note 195, at 103. 
236. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring Congress from enacting bills of attainder); 
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (barring states from enacting bills of attainder). See generally 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (discussing bills of attainder); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (same); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) 
(same). 
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very nearly what Justice White described in Patterson as the obvious 
case of legislative abuse which the Court would not abide.237 But a 
serious representational breakdown also may manifest itself in 
more subtle ways - specifically, in a criminal law that on its face 
sweeps more generally, but which features an atypical potential for 
harshness that maintains its political acceptability for the very rea­
son that it is not given and will not be given a full and consistent 
application in practice. The same social and cultural forces that op­
erate to close a group out of effective participation in the political 
process, or that inspire hostility or prejudice toward the group at 
the legislative level, may generally, though not always, operate at 
the administrative level of criminal law as well, bringing arbitrari­
ness and discrimination to the exercise of discretion. Dysfunction 
thus can radiate throughout the criminal justice system, leading to 
breakdowns at the legislative and the discretionary institutional 
level that are mutually reinforcing. 
Consider once again the examples of vagueness and unbridled 
capital-sentencing discretion, both of which, as Ely observed, bear 
strong indicia of dysfunctional safeguards which do not seem to 
have escaped the attention of the Justices.238 The paradigmatic 
vague statute - an antivagrancy ordinance of the sort declared un­
constitutional by the Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville239 
- theoretically puts all of us on thin ice. But most of us do not 
worry because that is not what the ordinance is really about, that is 
not why it was passed, and that is not how it will be enforced by the 
police and prosecutors with discretion to bring or drop charges. 
The powerless and unpopular are the ones who have to worry, for 
these laws in reality "are nets making easy the roundup of so-called 
undesirables."240 The standardless discretionary death penalty laws 
237. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
238. See ELY, supra note 195, at 176-77; see also Stuntz, supra note 11, at 21 (discussing 
vagueness in process-reinforcement terms). 
239. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The ordinance challenged in that case provided: 
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, 
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night 
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and 
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons 
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, 
habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually 
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where 
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon 
the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon convic­
tion in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses [punish­
able by 90 days' imprisonment, $500 fine, or both]. 
405 U.S. at 156 n.1. 
240. 405 U.S. at 171. 
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that Furman invalidated theoretically exposed every murderer to 
the unique risk of an unexplained and seemingly arbitrary death 
sentence, but society's better-connected murderers - and there 
have been some - really had very little reason to fear that risk. 
The discretion of prosecutors, judges, and juries diverted those de­
fendants away from death row. The unfortunate ones who truly 
bore the risk of being struck by the legal system's equivalent of 
lightning were the powerless and unpopular - racial minorities and 
the poor.241 As Ely tersely summed up, both of these examples 
"amount to failures of representation, in that those who make the 
laws (by refusing effectively to make the laws) have provided a 
buffer to ensure that they and theirs will not effectively be sub­
jected to them."242 
Robinson and Lambert evidence a similar judicial sensitivity to 
the breakdown of process safeguards. In both cases, the laws in 
question raised atypical risks of harshness when measured against 
the usual requirements for criminal liability. Standing alone, such 
atypical risks barely raise the hackles of a Constitution that sees 
criminal law as an ongoing process of imperfect tension adjust­
ments. But the buffers of which Ely spoke also ensured that in the 
final analysis these risks would be visited only upon the socially un­
popular and the politically powerless, people for whom the bless­
ings of political and institutional safeguards were effectively 
unavailable. 
When a legislature passes a law that criminalizes a "mere sta­
tus,"243 like the one criminalizing the status of narcotics addiction in 
Robinson, it creates a risk that is most unusual in criminal law: a 
risk of arrest and conviction without any proof of an actus reus -
proof of a voluntary act or omission contrary to preexisting legal 
proscription. To judge from the statute, you would think that this 
extraordinary risk hangs over the heads of a wide array of individu­
als, including many upstanding citizens whom we would not associ­
ate with a discrete and insular minority. But that is not how it 
works once discretionary enforcement is brought into the picture. 
In application, neither the middle-class housewife nor the young 
professional with a drug habit truly has much to fear from the 
"mere status" provision; their arrests and convictions will come, if 
they come at all, the old-fashioned way, with evidence of purchase, 
241. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 252 {1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) {ob­
serving that "[t]he Leopolds and Loebs are given prison terms, not sentenced to death"). 
242. ELY, supra note 195, at 177. 
243. The phrase is from Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 {1968) (plurality opinion). 
March 1998] Substantive Constitutional Criminal Law 1331 
possession, or use. The "mere status" provision has its real bite for 
the down-and-outs who, like Robinson himself, grind up against the 
police on a daily basis on the public streets. They are there on the 
streets, as Justice White noted in a similar connection in Powell v. 
Texas, "not because their disease [of addiction] compels them to be 
there, but because . . .  they have no place else to go and no place 
else to be . . . . This is more a function of economic station than of 
disease, although the disease may lead to destitution and perpetu­
ate that condition."244 Is it surprising that the license that "mere 
status" legislation grants to the law enforcement machinery to cut 
the usual legal comers that must be turned to lawfully stop, search, 
arrest, charge, and convict an individual ends up being exercised 
primarily if not exclusively against the downtrodden? Could a 
"mere status" crime survive long on the books if it were otherwise? 
In Lambert, a municipal ordinance established a registration 
system for the monitoring of all convicted felons who remained in 
Los Angeles for more than a few days.245 The Justices voiced no 
constitutional objection to the general policy behind such criminal 
registration laws, though Warren Christopher's celebrated amicus 
brief in the case mounted an impressive substantive due process 
challenge to the upset of privacy and personal liberty those laws can 
work.246 The problem that drew the attention of the Justices was 
the highly atypical risk to which Virginia Lambert herself was sub­
jected. Lambert was convicted for failing to register (usually, the 
law criminalizes acts of commission and not omissions), an obscure 
and unpublicized duty (when the criminal law imposes duties, they 
normally tend to be morally intuitive or well publicized among 
those who must perform them), on strict liability terms, without any 
proof of "actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the 
probability of such knowledge."247 To be sure, one might try to de­
fend the "no ifs, ands, or buts" nature of the law by raising the usual 
arguments supporting strict liability, including the need to en­
courage compliance with the law and to prevent false claims of ig­
norance that lead to erroneous acquittals, and by then ascribing 
those arguments to a fair and open political process whose repre­
sentational safeguards are in good working order. One also might 
point to the existence of discretionary safeguards against overly 
244. Powel� 392 U.S. at 551 (White, J., concurring in the result). 
245. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 226 (1957). 
246. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant at 21-46, Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 
225 (1957) (No. 47). 
247. See Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229. 
1332 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1269 
harsh applications of the law. But does any of this ring true in 
Lambert's case? The people upon whom this legislation imposes 
this unusual risk count for virtually nothing in the political process. 
The characteristic that defines their commonality, a record of a fel­
ony conviction, is triply disabling. It strips them of the franchise by 
law, it impedes their ability to organize by virtue of its embarrassing 
nature, and it arouses hostility and prejudice that no one can deny. 
To say that their interests were even remotely represented in the 
Los Angeles City Council is a considerable stretch, yet that is only 
half of the process problem. The individuals who actually will en­
dure the unusually harsh strict liability pinch of this law are people 
who, like Lambert, come under the unhappy eye of the police for 
other reasons, and whose failures to register are discovered when 
they are booked on some other charge or when a chagrined officer 
runs a background check. For people in Lambert's predicament, it 
seems safe to say, the system's discretionary mechanisms are most 
unlikely to operate as checks against "recalcitrant experiences."248 
In setting aside the criminal laws involved in Robinson and 
Lambert, the Court took no power of critical importance away from 
the legislatures. Legislative primacy in matters of substantive crimi­
nal law remained the rule. But sensitivity to the process underpin­
nings of that rule required that exceptions be noted when faith in 
process cannot conscionably be expressed. 
248. Warren Christopher's amicus brief filed on behalf of Lambert made this point with 
admirable delicacy: 
Since convicted persons are often not aware of their duty to register, the ordinance is 
susceptible of being used by the police to harass persons who are regarded as "undesir­
able." Although the statements attributed to former Los Angeles Chief of Police James ' 
Davis in Note, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 60, 63 n.17 (1954), suggest that there may have been 
selective harassment under the ordinance, the record here does not contain the evidence 
of systematic or intentional discrimination necessary to support such a charge . • . .  How­
ever, if intent were held to be a necessary element of the crime, the possibilities of unfair 
harassment would be drastically reduced if not totally eliminated. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant at 20 n.*, Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) 
(No. 47). The University of Pennsylvania Law Review Note cited by Christopher reported 
the following: 
Referring to the adoption of the Los Angeles, California, ordinance, it was reported 
that: "District Attorney Buron Fitts and Robert P. Stewart, chief deputy district attor­
ney, who framed the legislation, and Chief of Police James Davis, one of its chief sup­
porters, declare, however, that the very fact that dangerous ex-convicts will not register 
is the strength of the law. 
" 'In the past,' says Chief Davis, 'after every major crime we have picked up many 
suspects with criminal records. In some of these cases we have been sure that we had in 
custody the guilty men, but we often lacked legal proof to convict. Under the new regis­
tration laws, each of these men can now be dealt with not for the crime suspected, but 
for failing to register . . .  .'["] 
Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. 
L. REv. 60, 63 n.17 (1954) (quoting THE LITERARY DIGEST, Sept. 30, 1933, at 39). 
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CONCLUSION 
If process considerations influence the intersection of the Con­
stitution and substantive criminal law as deeply as this examination 
has indicated they do, three conclusions immediately suggest 
themselves. 
Scholars have their work cut out for them. Substantive constitu­
tional criminal law theorizing in the tradition of Henry Hart should 
continue, but equivalent efforts on the process front are long over­
due. We are in need of sustained scholarship that explores the 
dimensions of legislative primacy, the nature of process dysfunc­
tions, and the possibilities of process reinforcement in substantive 
criminal law. It can no longer be enough to equate process con­
cerns with a nondescript sense of judicial self-restraint, or to treat 
them as nuisances to counter or mollify in the course of substantive 
theorizing, or to conscript them in service of substantive theorizing 
without proper appreciation of their inherent limits.249 The task, as 
I have stressed, requires that process be taken seriously and that it 
be taken on its own terms. 
Those who teach the law have their work cut out for them as 
well. The conventional story line - the tale of the unfulfilled 
promise of substantive constitutional criminal law - should con­
tinue to be told, but the lesson is incomplete and misleading so long 
as it omits the process account of the Constitution and criminal law. 
Given prevailing curricular conventions, however, teaching the pro­
cess rendition may be difficult. The cases that dramatize and ulti­
mately explain the dominant influence that process considerations 
have . _,bad on the Court's jurisprudence currently are scattered 
across the typical law school curriculum - a phenomenon that I do 
not regard as coincidental, but which I take as an unsurprising re­
flection of the singlemindedness toward substance that has gripped 
criminal law scholars these many years. Until the decisions that 
make up the process account are brought together for consideration 
as closely related precedent, their collective teachings about legisla­
tive primacy and process reinforcement in the realm of substantive 
criminal law will remain diffused and obscured. 
Finally, the constitutional practitioners - bench and bar alike 
- also have work ahead of them. Intoning legislative primacy, fed­
eralism, and other familiar phrases in support of limited constitu­
tional intrusion upon society's use of the criminal sanction is easy 
enough. Converting those intonations into a mature and conscien-
249. See supra notes 116-17, 119 and accompanying text. 
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tious jurisprudence that respects healthy process, disrespects dys­
functional process, and possesses the tools needed to distinguish the 
two is more difficult. As we have seen, that slow and difficult work 
has been underway in the Supreme Court for some time. The chal­
lenge is to complete it. 
